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National-Local Cooperation: Opportunities and Lessons Learned for Secondary and Tertiary Prevention

Last updated:

07/12/2025

Publication Date:

07/12/2025

Content Type:

Policy Briefs

Issues:

National-Local Cooperation

Introduction

Across Europe, North America and other regions, cities are facing an increasingly complex threat landscape defined by rising hate, extremist mobilisation and deepening social polarisation. These challenges no longer sit solely within the remit of national security and other central government institutions and manifest most acutely at the local level, from city streets to schools, in social services, online communities and neighbourhoods undergoing demographic, economic or political change.

In recent years, the convergence of global conflicts, geopolitical tensions, algorithmically driven mis-/disinformation, and growing distrust in government has fuelled a spectrum of threats ranging from non-ideologically extremist motivated violence to targeted intimidation of public officials, rising hate speech and community tensions. Cities are simultaneously the frontline of these challenges and the first responders to their social consequences. Local authorities manage the grievances, disruptions and vulnerabilities that often underpin individual and societal harm. As a result, their role in identifying early signs of risk, vulnerabilities and/or needs, managing sensitive interventions and supporting rehabilitation or reintegration (R&R) is indispensable.

This makes understanding and maximising their role in secondary and tertiary prevention especially critical. Secondary prevention, which involves intervening early with individuals at elevated risk, relies on well-designed and trusted referral mechanisms linking schools, social services, police and community actors. Tertiary prevention, or the R&R of individuals already involved in extremist activity, requires robust interagency cooperation, continuity of care and sustained local support structures. Both forms of prevention are likely to be most effective when national and local government (and community-based) actors work together, share information appropriately and operate from a common strategic understanding.

This is where national-local cooperation (NLC) becomes particularly important. On one hand, national governments possess strategic insight, intelligence capabilities and legal authority; on the other, local governments possess contextual knowledge, community access, service-delivery capacity and legitimacy. When these strengths are aligned through coherent frameworks, prevention efforts become more effective and more sustainable. When they are disconnected, interventions risk being fragmented, mistrusted or ineffective.

Strong Cities has long recognised the critical importance of NLC in prevention. Since 2018, the Network has elevated NLC as a core pillar of its mission to empower cities – whether urban or rural, large or small – to address hate, extremism and polarisation. Working with national and local governments and cities, more broadly, globally, Strong Cities has supported multi-level consultations and facilitated NLC dialogues and cities’ efforts to strengthen referral pathways and R&R approaches. Strong Cities also partnered with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) to support the development of the GCTF’s NLC Good Practices and its NLC Implementation Toolkit. The latter identified six pillars as essential foundations for effective cooperation: trust, inclusivity, coordination, communication, capacity and sustainability. These pillars now form the conceptual structure of this policy note, as well as Strong Cities’ NLC work more broadly.

This policy note provides an overview of why NLC matters for secondary and tertiary prevention, in particular, and highlights good practices, opportunities and lessons learned, with examples from across the transatlantic space. It draws on Strong Cities’ work with national and local partners, as well as input from practitioners and policymakers who participated in various Strong Cities convenings and engagements where NLC featured on the agenda.

The note aims to serve as a practical resource for national and local government policymakers and practitioners, as well as community-based partners, seeking to strengthen collaboration, improve prevention outcomes and ensure that individuals at risk, or those returning from harmful environments, receive comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable support.

Pillar 1: Trust

Trust is a fundamental element of effective NLC. When developed and maintained, trust can enhance prevention efforts at all levels. When missing, it can severely limit the effectiveness of cooperation between national and local actors. Both trust between residents and government agencies, as well as inter-organisational trust between national and local government bodies, are essential for NLC to function effectively.

The roles and relationships between and among stakeholders will vary depending on contextual factors such as the national governance structure, local capacity and the nature of the challenges, but in every case, prevention work brings together a wide range of local and national actors, including elected officials, police and security services, schools, youth workers and community-based support services.

For this multi-stakeholder work to be effective, trust must flow in multiple directions. When national governments trust local government counterparts and other local stakeholders, they are more likely to include them in developing extremism prevention and intervention frameworks, increasing local ownership and effective policy implementation. Simultaneously, city governments and other local stakeholders are more likely to share information and cooperate in interventions if they trust that national government and law enforcement will respond appropriately. Trust between different communities is equally important, as it helps to reduce inter-communal tensions that can lead to violence and impede a unified response to violent extremism.

In countries where counter-terrorism measures have been overly broad or repressive, trust is generally lower. A highly securitised and centralised approach has frequently been demonstrated to exacerbate local grievances, some of which are at the roots of violent extremism. In such settings, local practitioners, community leaders and families may be reluctant to partner with central authorities. Where communities feel that public authorities listen to them and act fairly, residents may be more inclined to take part in prevention activities and to flag emerging problems early and otherwise share information about potential threats.

These trust dynamics are particularly important in secondary and tertiary prevention, where interventions involve vulnerable or high-risk individuals and the consequences of broken trust can directly undermine prevention efforts. For example, in secondary prevention, a lack of trust between national and local agencies may stymie referral pathways. A local school counsellor or social worker who identifies vulnerable youth may hesitate to report concerns if they believe the information will trigger an immediate security investigation, potentially alienating the family and pushing the individual further towards extremism and, potentially, violence. They need to trust that the referral will trigger a multi-disciplinary and holistic response that focuses on support and not just surveillance.

Similarly, tertiary prevention involving the R&R of former foreign terrorist fighters or violent extremist offenders requires strong coordination from national-level custody to local-level programmes. Local authorities must trust risk assessments provided by national agencies, whilst national agencies must have confidence that local bodies have the expertise and other capacities to manage the reintegration process. Without this mutual confidence, information is less likely to be shared, leaving the individual in a support vacuum that may increase the risk of recidivism.

Levels of trust may be increased by promoting local ownership and empowering local government and community leaders. Local governments are typically better placed than national officials to build and maintain trust-based relationships with residents. National governments can strengthen local leadership by facilitating the use of local, community-based structures that directly engage different community members and leverage them as trusted partners and credible voices. Leveraging existing trusted mechanisms, rather than creating parallel structures, can be key to maintaining this trust. When extremism and hate prevention strategies are integrated into established community platforms that already have the support of local organisations and communities, the risk of stigmatisation is reduced and the legitimacy of interventions is enhanced.

Canada’s national approach to prevention demonstrates how trust can be built when national actors invest meaningfully in local expertise. Central to this effort is Public Safety Canada’s Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence. Created in 2017, it serves as the federal lead for coordination and partnership-building across the country. Among its tools, Canada’s Community Resilience Fund (CRF) provides financial support to community-based organisations that are already embedded within local contexts and trusted by residents. While the CRF funds these organisations, it is the Canada Centre itself that actively works with them. It listens to local needs and, inter alia, provides guidance and supports the adaptation of existing services for secondary and tertiary prevention. This partnership model recognises that national authorities are often removed from the day-to-day realities facing communities and therefore cannot design effective interventions in isolation. By maintaining long-term relationships rather than episodic, project-based contact with community-based organisations, the Canada Centre ensures that local prevention partners are not only resourced but understood and empowered.

Although R&R in Kosovo is still largely centralised, the National Strategy for Sustainable Reintegration of Repatriated Persons in Kosovo allocates some implementation responsibilities to local authorities and social services in this work. Kosovo’s Ministry of Internal Affairs established the Division for Prevention and Reintegration of Radicalised Persons (DPRRP) in 2017 to oversee implementation of this framework, including through strengthened cooperation and trust-building between various actors. Specifically, one of the DPRRP’s key functions is to coordinate a localised response through existing public services provided by local governments, local bodies – such as Community Safety Councils and Centers for Social Work – as well as expertise from civil society. The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) has provided crucial support to these local governments and interdisciplinary teams through funding and capacity building to address violent extremism vulnerabilities and lead R&R efforts.

Trust is also enhanced through transparency. Sharing information about preventing and countering extremism (P/CVE) and related strategies and activities, as well as the processes that led to their development, enables greater participation and can counter misinformation about certain policies, including the purposes of R&R efforts. Therefore, national governments should seek to ensure transparency when developing and delivering prevention policies, for example, by establishing accountability mechanisms. Making independent evaluations of prevention policies and programmes publicly available not only demonstrates openness but helps reassure the public that these policies and programmes are evidence-based and are not politically motivated or targeting particular groups based on religious, ethnic or political grounds.

Building trusting relationships takes time, especially if there is a history of mistrust to overcome. Finland’s approach prioritises relationship-building and maintenance as opposed to ad hoc communication during crises. The Ministry of the Interior maintains a National P/CVE Cooperation Network with over 30 organisations, but crucially, ministry officials participate regularly in local cooperation group meetings to listen and understand local realities. This sustained face-to-face engagement builds relationships that enable low-threshold information-sharing. Finland’s characteristically low hierarchies facilitate open dialogue between police, social workers, healthcare experts and educators, helping them develop a common language and understanding. Local group chairs serve as members of the national cooperation group, creating direct channels that keep national policymakers grounded in local contexts.

Pillar 2: Inclusivity

Another core component of effective NLC is inclusivity. An inclusive approach considers the expertise, insights and experiences of various actors at national and local levels – including government bodies, civil society, community leaders, the private sector and the public. By bringing diverse voices to the table, governments can develop strategies to prevent hate, extremism and polarisation tailored to local contexts and needs.

To improve NLC, inclusivity should ideally be considered at all stages of prevention efforts: while developing strategies to identify and address threats and challenges; while implementing them to broaden ownership and build credibility; throughout monitoring and evaluation processes to understand impact and identify gaps; and during revisions to ensure strategies remain relevant and implementation efforts remain properly targeted. However, inclusivity needs to be representative and meaningful rather than tokenistic. National governments should continuously incorporate municipal government and other local perspectives into policy design, whilst local governments should ensure community voices inform how national priorities are delivered locally.

Inclusive NLC begins with an evidence-based understanding of local contexts. Local governments are well placed to capture community perspectives through surveys, mapping and other research that reaches all parts of a city. This evidence-gathering is a first step which allows governments to develop a common understanding of threats, vulnerabilities and needs, recognise the comparative advantages of different stakeholders, build meaningful relationships and identify existing resources and mechanisms that can be utilised.

National and local governments should create multiple avenues for public participation in decision-making processes that accommodate different ways of engaging and are sensitive to different languages, cultural norms and ways of gathering and sharing information. Some groups, particularly from historically marginalised or other under-served communities, may be unwilling to engage openly with government representatives. In such cases, governments may need to work with trusted intermediaries, such as community leaders or organisations.

The value of inclusivity becomes particularly evident in secondary and tertiary prevention. For example, in the former, civil society organisations, youth workers, teachers and social service providers are often better positioned than national agencies to recognise early warning signs of an individual becoming radicalised and engage such individuals before they commit to violence. However, their effectiveness often depends on inclusive NLC structures that enable them to share information with and receive support from national authorities without compromising community relationships or being perceived as extensions of security services. Without inclusive mechanisms that bridge national and local levels, create a dedicated space for non-security actors to interact and respect the distinct roles of different actors, frontline workers may hesitate to engage, leaving vulnerable individuals without support.

In tertiary prevention, national agencies often manage risk assessments and disengagement or deradicalisation programmes, whilst local actors deliver the day-to-day support necessary for peaceful reintegration into the community. Inclusive NLC helps ensure these actors work together rather than in silos.

It is important to consider how to sustain this inclusivity following policy adoption. Therefore, central governments should consider ways to incorporate inclusive consultations as an ongoing process that can help guide implementation and respond to threats, concerns and needs as they evolve. Some countries have addressed this by establishing dedicated consultative bodies. For example, Austria’s Federal Network for Extremism Prevention and Deradicalisation (BNED), a strategic advisory body established during the development of Austria’s Action Plan for Extremism Prevention, has become a permanent consultative mechanism. Coordinated by the federal Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service, the BNED brings together federal ministries, Austria’s nine states, municipal associations, civil society organisations and academic experts who meet regularly and convene additional sessions as needed. By institutionalising inclusive consultation rather than treating it as a one-off exercise, Austria helps ensure that diverse perspectives continuously inform implementation and that strategies remain responsive to ground-level realities.

Similarly, Germany’s Advice Centre on Radicalisation within the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees operates at both federal and regional levels. The centre coordinates secondary and tertiary prevention work, in collaboration with state and civil society partners. Under this approach, guidelines and funds are provided by the federal level, whereas the 16 Bundesländer (states) and municipalities are responsible for tailoring interventions to the local context – frequently in collaboration with CSOs that run individualised R&R programmes.

Belgium’s Strategy Terrorism, Extremism, Radicalisation Process (T.E.R.) represents a shift from a primarily repressive counterterrorism model towards a more inclusive, multi-agency and multi-level approach that brings together actors at every level of government. It formally incorporates the regions, communities, municipalities and psycho-social services, recognising that sustainable secondary and tertiary prevention requires more than security measures and central government engagement alone. Its design places local authorities at the centre of tailored interventions, supported by a network of consultation platforms that separate security-focused decision-making (Local Task Forces) from preventive, community-oriented action (Local Integrated Security Cells on Radicalism). An Information Officer bridges these structures, ensuring communication and coordination between social services and security partners. By embedding inclusivity into its architecture, Belgium’s model ensures that responses to terrorism, extremism and radicalisation reflect local realities, shared responsibilities and societal cohesion.

Pillar 3: Coordination

Effective coordination ensures that different national and local actors involved in hate and extremism prevention work together in a coherent manner. To be fully realised, a whole-of-society approach must consistently draw on and integrate contributions from various actors at different levels and sectors. Extensive coordination, both vertically between national and local levels and horizontally amongst actors and sectors at local, national and regional levels, is thus critical for effective NLC.

Coordination between national and local levels of government ensures that P/CVE and other relevant national strategies are informed by local realities and that local actors have the resources and support they need to implement these strategies. Horizontal coordination amongst different actors at the same level helps ensure that efforts are complementary and identify and address key gaps.

Effective coordination can be achieved by establishing dedicated coordination platforms, multi-agency bodies, information-sharing mechanisms and joint training exercises. These structures help to provide the architecture for sustained collaboration, creating spaces where actors can communicate regularly and address collective challenges. However, there is no one-size-fits-all coordination model, and the approach chosen should be tailored to reflect the specific political, legal, cultural and historical context. Importantly, coordination mechanisms should build upon and complement existing structures rather than creating parallel systems that may duplicate efforts or compete for resources.

Coordination requires clear protocols for information sharing that balance the need for collaboration with privacy protections and respect for the distinct mandates of different actors. This is particularly important when coordinating between security-focused agencies and community-based or social service providers, who may have different approaches, priorities and relationships with target communities: security agencies typically prioritise threat assessment and risk management, whilst community-based providers prioritise support, rehabilitation and social integration.

In secondary prevention, coordination is essential for establishing referral pathways where at-risk individuals can be directed to appropriate support services before they harm themselves or family or community members. This requires collaboration between diverse actors – schools, youth workers, social services, health care professionals, law enforcement and community organisations – each of whom may identify warning signs or vulnerabilities in different contexts. Effective coordination helps ensure that when a teacher, social worker or community leader identifies a vulnerable individual, there are clear mechanisms for referring them to multi-disciplinary support. This coordination must bridge national and local levels, connecting local frontline workers who identify at-risk individuals with both local and national resources and expertise.

Tertiary prevention requires coordinated efforts across multiple agencies and levels of government to support R&R. In many countries, national agencies often manage risk assessments, prison-based disengagement or deradicalisation programmes and probation services, whilst local actors provide housing, employment support, mental health services and community-based mentoring. Effective coordination ensures smooth handovers from national custody to local support systems. It can facilitate the various local service providers working together to create a support ecosystem rather than operating in silos. When coordination between national and local actors is effective, it helps to create a coherent pathway from custody through reintegration.

The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism (CVE Center) plays a central role in facilitating coordination between national and local levels. Established in 2018 in recognition of the need to strengthen cooperation across governance tiers, the CVE Center’s role became even more critical in 2023, when municipalities were, for the first time, given statutory responsibility for preventing violent extremism. Rather than implementing interventions itself, the CVE Centre supports municipalities by providing guidance, a national hotline and access to specialised expertise to ensure that national policy can be translated into locally relevant action. This structure enables municipalities to access tailored expertise and resources whilst maintaining local autonomy in implementation. The Centre’s responsive model – everything from brief consultations to sustained on-site support – enables municipalities to navigate complex cases and operational challenges while retaining autonomy in implementation. The addition of mobile support units further enhances this capacity, ensuring that even smaller or resource-constrained municipalities can access on-site assistance when needed.

The Danish Centre for Documentation and Counter Extremism, which sits within the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, demonstrates how a national coordination body can provide tailored support for municipalities and other local networking activities and knowledge exchange. The Centre supports a network of twelve ‘Info Houses’ (one for each police region), which facilitate crime-preventive collaboration at the local level between police, municipalities and other authorities such as regional psychiatry and the Prison and Probation Service.

Denmark’s approach illustrates how multi-agency coordination can embed security-related functions within municipal social infrastructure. At its core is the Info House, originally a joint platform of East Jutland Police and municipal services that acts as the central hub for handling concerns about potentially radicalising behaviour. Referrals from citizens and frontline professionals, such as school staff or youth services, are channelled to the Info House, which assesses each case and routes it to appropriate support. The model builds on Denmark’s decades-old SSP crime prevention framework (schools, social services and police), using its established channels for information sharing across sectors whilst adding specialist expertise on radicalisation. Roles are clearly differentiated: the Danish Security and Intelligence Service retains responsibility for national-level intelligence, threat assessments and guidance, whilst municipalities and their local partners deliver concrete interventions, including mentoring, counselling and exit-oriented support. Funding from national prevention programmes, combined with municipal resources, has allowed this model, which originated in the municipality of Aarhus, to be institutionalised beyond its initial pilot phase.

In Albania, the Coordination Center for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE Center) is functions as the central coordinating body driving the national P/CVE strategy, with a clear mandate to link national frameworks to municipal and community-level action. The CVE Center is organised into departments that cover education and research affairs, as well as civil society and security affairs, ensuring that prevention efforts integrate expertise from social, educational, security and community-based sectors. In practice, the CVE Center has worked closely with municipalities and local authorities, supporting them to create mechanisms for intervention and R&R with support from civil society organisations. With financial and technical support from GCERF, the CVE Center is working to establish a national referral mechanism that links national, municipal and community-level stakeholders, providing a sustainable structure for secondary prevention as well as support to Albanian nationals returning from conflict zones in the Middle East.

To manage the return of its citizens from Iraq and Syria, Germany implemented a comprehensive and coordinated approach to tertiary prevention. This approach – elaborated by the Federal Ministry of Interior and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees – was implemented by Returnee Coordinators who are strategically stationed across various German federal states. They are entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing the entire process from the return to the reintegration of returning citizens in their communities. They act as the nexus between federal, state and local stakeholders, including entities such as law enforcement, local government, local community, civil society organisations, counselling organisations and mental health institutions. The German approach acknowledges the complexity and diversity of returnee scenarios and recognises that each returnee’s situation demands a unique set of actions and collaborations with different institutions. The coordinator’s responsibility is also to consider each returnee’s unique circumstances. While the coordinators in all federal states share similar coordination responsibilities, their approaches vary due to their location within different departments and the support they receive from civil society organisations such as the Violence Prevention Network that specialise in interventions and R&R.

Pillar 4: Communication

Clear, consistent and trusted channels of communication between national and local actors, as well as between governments and the public, are indispensable for secondary and tertiary prevention efforts. When communication flows properly, local governments can translate national strategies into local action, national authorities can understand risks emerging from communities and all stakeholders can respond to cases of concern in a coordinated, timely and proportionate manner. When communication breaks down, however, referrals can stall, support mechanisms can become fragmented and individuals at risk may fall through the cracks.

Communication is especially significant in secondary and tertiary prevention because these areas rely on case-based information sharing, coordinated decision-making and sensitive engagement with individuals and families. Effective communication, therefore, requires not only the exchange of information, but clear expectations and responsibilities and the development and use of a common lexicon among agencies. This includes clarifying what information can be shared legally and ethically, and to whom, how risk is communicated and which actor is responsible for which intervention step.

NLC frameworks that reflect these communication standards provide the foundation for joint assessments, referral pathways and R&R processes more broadly. Below are examples from Europe and North America that demonstrate how improved communication strengthens national-local cooperation in secondary and tertiary prevention.

The UK’s Channel Programme, a part of its counterterrorism strategy CONTEST, has long depended on strong communication between national and local actors to manage secondary prevention cases. Local Channel Panels are led by local authorities but link closely with the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Policing and the other relevant national government actors, ensuring two-way communication on case management, risk factors and available interventions. The UK government has developed a Prevent duty toolkit for local authorities, where communication is not only emphasised for information sharing, but also for guidance on definitions and terminology, awareness raising among vulnerable communities and individuals of radicalisation risks, engaging news media on sensitive topics and setting up a communication and engagement administrative structure.

Finland’s National Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Violent Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2024-2027) – the third iteration of the country’s national prevention framework – embeds communication as a core expectation in national-local cooperation. Similar to the UK, national authorities share evolving threat assessments with municipalities, while local multia-gency units called Anchor Teams feed real-time situational information back to the Ministry of Interior. This communication helps Anchor teams more easily coordinate referrals and discuss cases requiring early intervention. Additionally, Finland’s online coordination platform, TOUVI, supports communication by allowing registered practitioners at national and local levels to share materials, training and case-related updates.

In the United States, several counties operate multi-disciplinary behavioural threat assessment units that include schools, public health agencies, police and social services. These models align with federal guidance issued by federal government departments, including the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, to streamline and improve information sharing among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and communities. Additionally, when ideological grievances or extremist indicators emerge and these teams communicate with federal agencies, they rely on communication protocols shaped by legal requirements such as HIPAA and FERPA, two distinct federal laws designed to protect privacy and fundamental freedoms of individuals and thus the credibility of this process.

Pillar 5: Capacity Building

Capacity building is a core pillar of effective NLC and its importance becomes especially clear in the context of secondary and tertiary prevention. Local authorities require unique skills, knowledge, structures, expertise and sustained support to effectively support individuals at risk and manage R&R processes. Without systematic learning and building of capacities tailored to local realities the prevention ecosystem becomes uneven, fragmented and highly dependent on individual abilities rather than resilient institutional processes. At the same time, local actors cannot operationalise what they do not understand; hence, national frameworks need to be accompanied by local training resources with guidance translated into practical tools and delivered with coaching and mentoring.

On secondary prevention, capacity building ensures that local practitioners can identify early signs of vulnerability, manage referrals confidently and participate in multi-agency case conferences with clarity about roles and expectations. On tertiary prevention, it strengthens the ability of local governments, civil society organisations and service providers to design and deliver R&R packages, understand and manage complex risks and coordinate with national agencies responsible for security, surveillance or release planning.

However, capacity building is not only relevant for the local level. NLC relies on both sides understanding the policy framework, operating procedures and expectations of their counterparts and allows comparative advantages of national and local actors to reinforce one another. Additionally, it needs to be continuous and not ad hoc for long-term professionalisation of the administration.

Across Europe and North America, countries that have institutionalised capacity building as a formal part of their prevention architecture such as regular joint trainings, embedded national–local liaison officers, national standards for local delivery and shared professional networks, have tended to demonstrate stronger NLC.

Sweden’s CVE Center plays a crucial role in strengthening municipal capacities through training, publications, tailored coaching and technical guidance on topics from behavioural indicators in risk assessment to threat assessment. Much of this support is offered through mobile support teams that are designed to address the needs of practitioners and municipal officials across the country on all matters relevant to extremism prevention. The Center also convenes national–local and local-local learning networks and facilitates peer-to-peer exchanges, a critical tool for helping municipalities with fewer resources learn from better-resourced. It additionally runs digital resource libraries with standardised basic and in-depth courses while also offering bespoke and needs-based training to municipalities and other local actors. By standardising knowledge and offering continuous tailored support, including through a professional support hotline, the Centre ensures that municipal actors, regardless of size or capability, can meaningfully participate in national frameworks for secondary and tertiary prevention.

The United States’ capacity-building ecosystem for targeted violence and violent extremism prevention had been anchored in the Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3), before it was largely disbanded in 2025. Until then, CP3, through its Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program had provided nearly $90 million in funding (since 2016), which has trained around 38,250 people and reached 28,308,418 people across the United States. These funds and training for state, county and city governments, school districts and community organisations have been used to build and operate multidisciplinary BTAMs in a number of localities across the country. The programme provided Strong Cities funding to allow it to provide training and other capacity-building support to more than a dozen small and mid-sized cities across the country. To further support local stakeholders, CP3 also developed and provided a range of tools and information on addressing targeted violence and fostering public safety. This includes an audiovisual resource library for more effective and efficient learning.

Pillar 6: Sustainability

Sustainability is essential for effective NLC. Even where strong coordination and communication frameworks exist, secondary and tertiary prevention will falter without the structures, mandates, political backing and multi-year investments required to maintain them. Sustainability ensures that national and local systems can adapt to emerging threats, prevent institutional memory loss caused by staff turnover, integrate lessons learned and transition from ad hoc case responses to long-term and predictable practice. In many countries, prevention work expands and contracts in response to crises; sustainability ensures that structures built during high-risk moments remain functional and relevant once the immediate threat subsides. For NLC, sustainability is also about continuity: ensuring that local governments are consistently empowered to deliver referral, intervention and R&R efforts, and that national frameworks remain resilient to political change.

Secondary and tertiary prevention rely on stable ecosystems of actors such as municipal caseworkers, police, health services, probation officers, community organisations, and national specialists. These ecosystems require predictable funding, ongoing training, durable coordination mechanisms and dedicated staff time. Referral pathways must be available continuously, not only during crisis periods, and R&R processes must extend well beyond short-term measures. If sustainability is weak, individuals at risk or re-entering society after radicalisation may face gaps in support, insufficient follow-up, or fragmentation between national and local authorities. This weakens trust, increases recidivism risk and undermines the credibility of prevention strategies. Sustainable systems ensure that long-term support such as housing, mentoring, psychological care, job placement and family engagement remains consistent, localised and aligned with national oversight.

Long-term financing is one of the most consistent determinants of sustainability. Many European and North American prevention programmes initially succeed through time-limited grants but struggle when external funding cycles end. National governments have a critical role in stabilising local capacities by embedding prevention within multi-year budget lines, rather than project-based allocations.

Switzerland’s National Action Plan to Prevent Radicalisation (2023 – 2027) embeds sustainability by financing prevention measures through a structured federal grant-making mechanism that supports cantonal and municipal initiatives. Rather than running programmes centrally, the federal government provides targeted co-funding that enables local authorities and civil society organisations to develop context-specific interventions aligned with national priorities. This approach ensures long-term continuity, as funding decisions are tied to evidence of impact, regular reporting and independent evaluations, which encourages the refinement and scaling of effective practices. By decentralising ownership and resourcing, the mechanism strengthens local capacity, reduces reliance on short-term projects, and incentivises long-term collaboration among local, cantonal and national actors.

Similarly, the above-mentioned Canadian CRF was created in 2017 to support the development and delivery of innovative research and frontline intervention programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism. To date, it has enabled 80+ locally-led projects and its success is largely rooted in two key components: sustainability, where grants can last up to ten years, and allowing significant local control and ownership of the initiatives. Examples of CRF-supported local R&R programmes, include the John Howard Society of Ottawa’s Project ReSet, which provides multi-disciplinary case management, disengagement support and reintegration for individuals at risk of or exiting extremist involvement; the Edmonton (Alberta)-based Organization for the Prevention of Violence, participates in CRF-supported efforts aimed at preventing and intervening in paths towards radicalisation, violence or hate-motivated activity in the Prairies region; the Yorktown Family Services in Toronto, which provides community-based support, counselling and R&R efforts to address systemic challenges and provide tailored local responses. In each of these examples, the municipal government and local police are involved in the programmes and illustrate how national-level grant mechanisms can enable locally rooted, municipality-based intervention initiatives that strengthen cooperation across government, civil society and community actors. In addition, and much like the CP3, CRF funding has allowed Strong Cities to provide tailored prevention-related training and guidance to a number of small and mid-sized municipalities, which had previously not had the opportunity to receive this type of support.

Sustainability is strengthened when responsibility for prevention is institutionalised in a stable national-local architecture, rather than temporary working groups or pilot teams. Dedicated structures improve consistency, clarify mandates and safeguard collaboration during political transitions. France’s Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR) plays a key sustainability role by anchoring prevention mandates in national decrees. Municipalities are legally required to maintain Local Security and Crime Prevention Councils (CLSPD), which integrate extremism prevention and radicalisation case management as part of their broader public security mandate. The legal framework allows already existing and relevant mechanisms to be used for developing responses to emerging and evolving threats without creating new bodies that might overlap in jurisdiction or leaving a jurisdictional gap.

A prevention system is only sustainable if it learns and adapts, as needed. Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) allow national and local actors to track trends, identify weak points, document successful interventions and adapt to evolving threats. MEL also strengthens legitimacy and transparency, encouraging continued funding and political support. Nevertheless, while MEL frameworks exist for broader extremism prevention programmes, there is a gap in the development of robust M&E tools for secondary and tertiary prevention programmes. For example, a recent study of the Danish model found that there were no evaluations of the impact of initiatives, but only of the quality of implementation. Furthermore, a cross-border analysis of MEL on interventions found that most evaluations are descriptive and are based on weak research designs and internal evaluations. Despite this, the study found that more programmes are putting an emphasis on robust MEL to fill this knowledge gap and allow stakeholders to develop stronger initiatives.

One example of this is Australia’s evaluation of its Living Safe Together Intervention Program, which supports driving long-term sustainability by ensuring that secondary prevention measures remain effective, accountable and aligned with evolving needs. Regular, independent evaluations were built into the programme’s design, enabling policymakers to assess not only whether interventions were reducing risk, but how participants progressed over time and which elements generated the most impact. These evaluations examined case outcomes, practitioner experiences, referral pathways, interagency coordination, and the extent to which supports such as mentoring, counselling or family engagement contributed to behavioural change. Importantly, findings from these assessments informed iterative improvements, with new tools, guidance and training modules introduced to address identified gaps and strengthen delivery capacity. By demonstrating measurable results, the evaluation process helped secure continued political and financial backing, ensuring the programme did not remain dependent on short-term funding cycles. In this way, Australia shows that sustainability in NLC is not achieved by longevity alone, but by embedding evaluation mechanisms that continually refine practice, build trust across sectors and justify long-term investment.

Conclusion

The complexity and fluidity of today’s extremist and hate-driven threat landscape require responses that are not only multi-sectoral but genuinely multi-level. No single tier of government, whether national, regional or local, possesses all the insights, tools or relationships needed to prevent radicalisation to violence, support at-risk individuals or reintegrate those seeking to withdraw from extremist groups or environments. Cities, with their proximity to communities and understanding of local dynamics, hold a unique vantage point in this work. National governments, with their strategic overview, legislative authority and access to intelligence and security resources, provide the essential scaffolding. Bringing these strengths together through structured, sustained NLC is therefore not simply desirable; it is foundational for effective secondary and tertiary prevention.

Each of these pillars examined above offers a lens through which national and local actors can assess and strengthen their approaches, and each becomes more consequential when applied to the context of supporting individuals at elevated risk, or those transitioning out of extremist or hate-motivated environments. When trust is weak, referrals fail. When communication falters, risk escalates. When capacity is uneven, R&R efforts fragment. When sustainability is uncertain, promising initiatives dissolve as soon as political priorities shift.

The examples highlighted throughout this note demonstrate how these interrelated pillars operate in practice. They show that effective NLC does not depend on one single model or institutional design. Instead, it requires a commitment to shared responsibility, respectful collaboration across mandates and an understanding that prevention is most credible when embedded in the social fabric of communities. Regardless of how NLC is set up, the underlying logic remains constant: cities and national authorities are interdependent actors in identifying, supporting and reintegrating individuals whose pathways intersect with hate and extremism.

As countries across Europe and North America grapple with increasingly hybridised threats – in both the on- and offline spaces – NLC will become only more important. The lessons, opportunities and good practices outlined in this note are intended to support central and local governments in strengthening their frameworks, enhancing their referral and reintegration pathways and building more joined-up and sustainable prevention ecosystems.

Ultimately, effective secondary and tertiary prevention is a shared endeavour. It depends as much on national leadership as it does on local innovation; as much on coherent policy as on trusted relationships; as much on technical interventions as on human connection. By investing in robust NLC, governments can ensure that individuals receive timely, appropriate and coordinated support—and that communities are better protected, more resilient and more cohesive in the face of evolving threats.

Additional Resources

• A Toolkit for Cities: Building a Multi-Actor Local Prevention Framework. Strong Cities Network (2025)
• National-Local Cooperation: A Pillar of City-Led Prevention of Hate, Extremism and Polarisation – A Practice Update. Strong Cities Network (2024)
• A Roadmap for Operationalizing a Whole of Society Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism. Global Counterterrorism Forum (2022).
• Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism. Global Counterterrorism Forum (2020).
• Implementation of the GCTF Good Practices for National-Local Cooperation: Mapping Strengths and Challenges in East and Southern Africa. Strong Cities Network and RUSI (2022).
• The GCTF’s Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in P/CVE: Mapping the Implementation, Progress, Gaps, Needs and Priorities in Uganda. Strong Cities Network (2022).
• A Guide For City-Led Response. Strong Cities Network. March 2024 (Updated 2025)
• A Guide For Mayors: Preventing and Responding to Hate, Extremism & Polarisation. Strong Cities Network. November 2023 (Updated March 2025) 
• A Guide For Cities: Preventing Hate, Extremism & Polarisation. Strong Cities Network. November 2023 (Updated April 2025)

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