A Guide For Cities: Preventing Hate, Extremism & Polarisation

Last updated:

17/01/2025

Publication Date:

12/09/2023

Content Type:

Toolkits & Guides

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Strong Cities Network A Guide For Cities

Chapter 5: Secondary Prevention

Secondary

Programmes and other measures that target individuals identified as being vulnerable to recruitment or radicalisation to hate or extremist violence and seek to steer these individuals down a non-violent path.

Secondary prevention encompasses the ways in which a city can take action in response to a more specific risk or challenge. Unlike primary prevention, it is not aimed at the general population and is developed and delivered to tackle a particular issue relevant specifically to hate, extremism and polarisation and often targeting a particular group or individual. For this reason, secondary prevention is even more reliant on comprehensive local mapping and should closely correlate to the key vulnerabilities and needs identified (see Chapter 2).

Vulnerable Groups

Secondary prevention will often focus on specific vulnerabilities, such as a lack of critical thinking skills coupled with particular exposure to hateful dissemination; a concern about racial or ethnic discrimination; or a challenge around marginalisation and feelings of distrust, isolation and disenfranchisement.

Typically, the approaches and considerations identified for primary prevention are still relevant; however, the specific methodologies followed, objectives identified and messages relayed will be more targeted. Interventions may also be over a longer period and follow a particular programme or other sequencing. It should be noted that a city’s training needs will likely be more significant and/or specialised, depending on the context, the vulnerability it is addressing and the professional backgrounds and competencies of the relevant local government offices or practitioners.

Individuals

In relation to secondary prevention with individuals, this Guide will focus predominantly on referral mechanisms of various kinds, in line with the priorities expressed by cities consulted for this Guide. Referral mechanisms have emerged in a number of fields, including human-trafficking, drug abuse, gender-based violence, violence reduction and P/CVE. They typically involve a formal or informal process whereby front-line practitioners, community members, family members or peers can refer individuals demonstrating certain concerning behaviours or vulnerabilities to a group of practitioners and professionals from different disciplines and/or agencies and organisations to identify, assess, assist, and treat those individuals.

There has been growing recognition of the added-value of locally-led referral mechanisms in the hate and extremism prevention space, as policymakers, front-line workers and even security professionals have increasingly prioritised the need to identify those most vulnerable to or already on the path to violence and to steer them down a non-violent path. In recent years, they have emerged in different local contexts, in some cases city-led and managed. In some contexts they aim to prevent a variety of social harms (including extremist violence), in others they are narrowly focused on P/CVE. Different labels have been used for these mechanisms, such as ‘situation tables‘ (Canada), ‘info-houses‘ (Denmark), ‘safety houses‘ (the Netherlands), ‘partner tables’ (Belgium), Anchor teams (Finland) and ‘Channel panels‘ (the United Kingdom).

As reflected in the OSCE guide on the topic, although there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the design and operationalisation of a referral mechanism, it is typically a multiagency and/or multidisciplinary programme, platform, or initiative that has a number of common features.

It includes representatives from a range of city or other government agencies and CSOs from across different disciplines, for example, including education, health, social welfare, housing, youth, sports, and, if appropriate, police;
It receives referrals from community or family members, front-line workers and government officials, of individuals identified as most vulnerable to, or on the path to engaging with hate- or extremist- motivated (or other forms of) violence but who have not committed to violence;
It assesses the risks, needs, vulnerabilities and protective factors of the referred individual to determine the appropriate course of action; and It designs, delivers, monitors, and evaluates individually tailored interventions or support plans that address the needs and vulnerabilities of those deemed most at risk of or vulnerable to becoming violent and helps steer them down a peaceful path.

In the hate and extremism prevention space, these processes can offer concerned family members or peers an alternative to calling the police and potentially risking immediate and heavy-handed security action. They can facilitate the early involvement of a range of professionals who might be well-placed “to deliver an effective and preventive intervention because they have particular competence, expertise, perceived credibility or legitimacy that the police … do not possess”. Their effectiveness relies on the commitment, skill and experience of the practitioners involved with the referred individual. It also depends on the level of trust among the different professionals and agencies involved in the mechanism, and between those professionals and agencies and the relevant local communities. Since such mechanisms need to rely heavily on front-line workers, service providers and community-based organisations, while enabling cooperation among them, local governments can play central roles in supporting and managing them.

Considerations for Cities

Types of Referral Mechanisms

Referral mechanisms can be operated by city employees, social/youth workers, local police, CSOs or almost any of the stakeholders and services discussed throughout this Guide, provided that training is offered and there is a robust ethical framework. They can ‘target’ a certain audience (for example families) or be open to the general public, including friends, neighbours, or colleagues. Self-referral is another possibility, especially where an individual actively seeks support to mitigate risks they have become exposed to, but lacks the resources, motivation, or confidence to do so entirely independently.

Some ways to make a referral:

Telephone helpline
Website reporting mechanisms
Mobile applications
Institutional ‘signposting’ (where a local institution or service provider raises a concern or directs individuals to an appropriate service)

Risks/challenges associated with different methods of referral

Stigmatisation
Data security and personal information See Information-sharing systems: 5 top tips in Chapter 7
Fear of criminalisation
Improper use or abuse to serve political or other ends
Requires 24/7 staffing
Tech-based platforms require maintenance, updates and added security for data protection. They also will not suit everybody, where familiarity, access, language and other issues pose barriers.

Overall, any referral mechanism should:

Rely on context-specific local research and include factors linked to the targeted population;
Consult with local professionals and practitioners, including for the purposes of relying on multiple sources of information;
Take into account the wider political and social contexts;
Account for protective and resilience factors, as well as for extremism-related risks;
Be informed by and linked to available interventions and
support services.

Source: OSCE, Understanding Referral Mechanisms (2019)

Avoiding Stigmatisation

The basic goal of any referral system is to collect information about individual cases and the nature of the concerns that have been raised. This requires the identification of some basic indicators (for example, what should be considered a sign of potential vulnerability to extremist-motivated violence?). Identifying and answering these questions (a) requires consultation with and input from a multi-stakeholder team and may require additional professional input and (b) will determine the key areas in which the referral mechanism may risk causing or exacerbating stigmatisation. One way to reduce stigmatisation is to focus on objective behavioural signs, rather than personality characteristics. Any referral mechanism should avoid targeting specific religious or political groups or ideologies. Referred individuals should not be portrayed as potential criminals or security threats but should, at the very least at the first stage of assessment, be regarded as vulnerable individuals in need of help and support to avoid causing themselves and others harm.

Screening and Assessment

Once an individual has been referred, the first step will generally be a screening ahead of a full assessment. An initial screening enables basic verification of the details included in the referral and an assessment of suitability and relevance for a referral. This enables signposting to other services in cases where an individual’s needs may be better addressed outside of the mechanism and triggers potential community engagement or other forms of intervention if needed. Individual cases that meet the eligibility indicators identified are then put forward for a full assessment, which should be conducted by a multi-stakeholder board or panel with different services/departments and professional expertise represented.

The assessment will determine to what degree the person is exposed to a particular risk, based on clear methodology and shared and objective indicators. The assessment should also serve to identify risk/vulnerability and protective factors, which will open avenues for potential intervention. Assessment tools come in all forms. Some of them are merely indicative, whereas others incorporate checklists or are more formalised and involve structured professional judgement. There is also significant variation in how easily transferrable these tools are to new contexts.

Keeping in mind that no such tool can ever be perfect, it is crucial to select or develop assessment tools that practitioners and professionals feel comfortable with. The assessment should inform the type of intervention as well as the best-placed intervention provider, either a particular service or profession and/or a specific individual. It is also critically important to mitigate possible harms during assessments (to individuals and communities but also, by association, to the integrity of and trust in a city’s approach) and to understand the risks, needs and strengths of different approaches.

Types of Interventions

Hate, extremism and polarisation are complex, social phenomena that cannot be reduced to one area of risk or set of causes alone. The interplay between different risk factors and potential causes, or drivers, is as important as the context in which they develop. Interventions must therefore be multidisciplinary and based on strong cooperation between different services, agencies, departments, or stakeholders, and involve a cooperative approach.

Cities with individual intervention models that contributed to this Guide felt it important to emphasise that, in most cases, addressing hate, extremism and polarisation is not intrinsically different from dealing with other social issue. The intervention provider will address these issues in line with their professional practice and while there may be specialised training or background needed to approach a particular case (for example, trauma-informed care or how to recognise extremist symbols), the basic approach and activities will often remain consistent.

In this respect, it was felt that most cases benefitted from cities incorporating the challenges of hate, extremism and polarisation into existing professional approaches, rather than creating a new profession or model entirely.

Intervention programmes can take different forms, based on particular and recurring needs and priorities, but also based on available resources at the local level. The following options, or a combination thereof, were highlighted by cities as common areas
of intervention.

Social/youth work: the intervention will focus on living conditions, education, social integration, access to training and employment, etc;
Mentorship: the intervention will be based on a personal and fully agreed relationship between a mentor and a mentee;
Psychology and psycho-social support: the intervention will focus on psychological wellbeing and state of mind, but only rarely psychiatric disorders; it will simultaneously address the influence that different social environments can have on the individual’s physical and mental health; and
Family: the aim of the intervention is either to support a family and parents in fostering caring and educational environments or to address a risk identified within a family setting.

Important:

Interventions should address something that matters to individuals/families;
Interventions should be supportive, facilitate dignity and avoid stigma;
Interventions should be mindful of ‘unintended consequences’.

Source: IIJ Training Curriculum: Developing Multi-Actor P/CVE Intervention
Programmes – Implementing a Whole-of-Society, ‘Do No Harm’ Approach (2021)

A key challenge that many cities raised was that most individual interventions at the secondary prevention level are based on voluntary participation. This requires investment from the individual themselves to engage in the intervention and for the individual to see the value of engaging in the first place. It also requires interventions to meet the needs and expectations of the individual themselves requiring additional, thorough assessment. Understanding what will motivate an individual or family to participate is key, as is ensuring that people are not overloaded by too many interventions and that the intensity of an intervention corresponds to the level of risk posed.

Supporting Existing Mechanisms

Cities may choose not to establish their own referral mechanism, perhaps in an effort to avoid duplication with a national one or perhaps because they lack a sufficient mandate to develop one. Alternatively, they may focus on leveraging an existing mechanism and integrating aspects of preventing hate and extremism into structures already addressing different harms (e.g., sexual violence, people trafficking or wider crime prevention). Even when cities are not developing or leveraging mechanisms at local or regional levels, they can often play an important role in promoting national mechanisms, building trust in them, and combating mis/disinformation and conspiracy narratives relating to them.

A number of countries have general crime prevention hotlines, with a growing number (including Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Luxembourg) having put in place dedicated helplines for concerns around hate and extremism.

Safety House Model, The Netherlands: In the Netherlands, ‘Safety Houses’ are local networks that bring together municipal representatives, the police, community-based organisations and others to discuss and jointly develop programmes to address different community safety concerns. While originally focused on broader crime prevention, the model expanded to include extremism prevention following the departure of several Dutch citizens to join ISIS.

In some contexts the choice may not be limited to either local or national mechanisms; there are also examples of regional mechanisms.

In British Columbia, Canada, rather than setting up a programme in different cities across the geographically expansive territory, the provincial government set up a single programme (Shift-BC) to support the secondary prevention requirements of cities and their residents across the province. On an as-needed basis, the province – through its Department of Public Safety, and with funding from the federal government – connects individuals who may be at risk of extremist-motivated violence with local counselling, social services, or other tools. The programme also provides training to psychosocial and other relevant service providers across the province who work with those referred to them by Shift. As reflected in the IIJ Training Curriculum, this approach may have “appeal where resources and capacities are limited, and the expected caseload may not warrant investing in standing mechanisms in different parts of the country, state, or province.”

If a central government has already opened a hotline or website to collect referrals, a city might also provide additional support and information to concerned families or individuals. This may be helpful when a party is hesitant or unsure about making a referral and wants to receive advice short of actually making the referral. In such cases, avoiding overlap and making very clear the distinction between the two services and what the city is responsible for is imperative.

Depending on demand, there may also be a need to support a twin approach that combines government-administered and CSO-administered hotlines and other mechanisms. This might cater both to those people who feel more comfortable contacting a government hotline and to those who prefer speaking to a non-governmental, community-led one.

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