A Guide For Cities: Preventing Hate, Extremism & Polarisation

Last updated:

12/04/2025

Publication Date:

12/09/2023

Content Type:

Tools & Guides

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Strong Cities Network A Guide For Cities

Chapter 3: Strategy

This chapter looks at how cities can develop or expand their mandate to deliver prevention and discusses different strategic approaches that can be adopted and institutionalised to promote local ownership and sustainability. Finally, it addresses sustainability and resource mobilisation – including human, financial and other resources that need to be considered by local governments – recognising existing lilmitations, other priorities that cities face and the potential efficiency and wider benefits of leveraging existing approaches.

A city’s mandate

For many cities, securing a mandate for prevention – meaning the authority, requirement and/or functional responsibility to engage in this work – is the first hurdle. It may seem obvious, but the strength, extent and potential opaqueness of such a mandate will have real implications for what a city can actually do.

Securing a local government mandate will be contingent on an awareness and understanding of the political will to address the hate, extremism and polarisation threats manifesting in the city. This can involve a commitment to prioritise prevention alongside (or as part of) more traditional local government priorities, e.g., those related to public safety, violence prevention and social wellbeing.

Securing a mandate also requires recognition at both the national and local levels that cities have a role to play in a whole-of-society approach to addressing these threats along with the political and legal space for them to assume such a role. This can typically necessitate a modicum of cooperation between national and local stakeholders National-Local Cooperation (NLC) in a particular context. NLC will be addressed in Chapter 6, but readers can explore the topic in depth using the NLC Toolkit.

A city’s mandate can come in different forms depending on existing legal and governance frameworks, the degree of decentralisation and the prioritisation of prevention in relation to the perceived threat, to name just some of the variables. The box below gives an overview of some of the different ways this mandate works in cities around the world.

Local government prevention-related mandates in different countries

In Bangladesh, cities are mandated by the central government to participate in local governance and engagement of citizens through the formation of a town-level coordination committee (TLCC), Ward-level Coordination Committee (WLCC) and a mandatory formation of a gender committee with a female councillor as the chair. These structures are then tasked to actively engage citizens through the development of a citizens’ report card, regular town meetings and a citizens’ complaint cell and mass communication cell. These structures feed into the development of a city development plan including a gender action- and poverty action plan.
In France, local governments do not have a legal mandate to involve themselves in the prevention of hate- or extremist-motivated violence but they do have a mandate in crime prevention and are not prohibited from developing their own policies on hate and extremism prevention.
In Indonesia, the national action plan on preventing and countering violent extremism encourages local governments to become involved in addressing violent extremism and requires them to report to the national government twice a year on their efforts to support implementation of the national plan.
In Iraq, the central government provided the districts a clear mandate to develop prevention approaches as part of their efforts to facilitate implementation of the national strategy on countering violent extremism; seven districts have so far developed localised plans in coordination with the National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and with support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
In Kenya, County Governments are required to develop County Action Plans setting out the approaches and activities taken by local government in accordance with the national strategy to counter violent extremism and in coordination with the National Counter Terrorism Centre.
In Malaysia, although there is no explicit mandate for cities on preventing hate and extremism, there is a public safety function served by cities with an associated budget line and ongoing NLC to explore the potential contribution local governments can make to hate and extremism prevention efforts.
In North Macedonia, the national P/CVE strategy mentions the role local governments can play in implementation and the central government is directly engaging municipalities on this.
In Norway, all cities were tasked with developing local plans to support the implementation of the National Action Plan against radicalisation and violent extremism, but encouraged to leverage existing local crime prevention frameworks and structures for doing so.
In Poland, although there is no national prevention framework, the city of Dąbrowa Górnicza, leveraging its public safety mandate, established a local team, in cooperation with civil society, to address radicalisation to violence in the city.
In Serbia, following the school shooting, the Ministry of Local Self Government has asked all cities and municipalities to form Local Safety Councils, which would deal specifically with prevention.
In the United Kingdom, under the national Prevent strategy, some local governments have a legal duty to manage local Channel panels focused on individual interventions with at risk individuals, as well as wider requirements to develop or support community-wide prevention initiatives.

Key questions and considerations

Does the city have an explicit mandate to contribute to a whole-of-society approach to addressing hate, extremism and polarisation? From where does this mandate derive, for example, national framework or legislation, city council resolution or decision?
Does the city have the authority to do so as part of a broader, existing mandate related to, for example, public safety, violence or crime prevention or social well-being?
Is there an option for the city to adopt its own mandate, for example, based on a municipal council decision? This could also be done to further strengthen or provide a degree of local ownership alongside an existing mandate granted by the national government.
How narrow is the mandate? Does the mandate only apply to specific threats, for example, a single form of hate or extremism, or is it broader to include all forms or even a wider set of social harms?
Are all relevant offices and actors aware of their mandate and how they are meant to work within it to support local and national prevention efforts?

There are several other considerations for a city beyond the formal granting of the mandate itself. Where a mandate exists for cities, it is critical that all relevant departments and actors are aware of it and the role they play to support prevention. Several local government officials consulted for this Guide expressed frustration that although there is national strategy in place that acknowledges or outlines a role for local government, it has not been shared with cities, let alone benefitted from their input.

For instance, Uganda developed a National P/CVE Strategy, but cities emphasised at an April 2023 Strong Cities workshop that they are unaware of its existence because it has neither been publicly released nor shared with them directly and they were not asked to contribute their local perspectives and needs to its development. This has led to confusion around their mandate and a lack of structures, capacities, skills and the resources needed to implement the strategy at the local level.

Sharing relevant national frameworks with cities is thus a prerequisite to meaningful and sustainable involvement of local governments in a whole-of-society approach to the prevention of hate and extremism in their country. For their part, local governments need to ensure that awareness of these frameworks is not restricted to one or two city officials but is well socialised across different departments and with the political leadership of the city.

Is the mandate sufficient?

Where a city has a mandate, it needs to consider whether it is sufficiently to meaningfully address the challenges affecting its communities.

Is the city’s mandate focused only on alerting security agencies in the event of an immediate concern or incident, or does it also include scope to intervene earlier and develop community-level prevention programmes and activities? Equally, if the city has a public safety role, how expansive is it? Is it limited to practical security considerations, such as safeguarding public gathering places and other ‘soft’ targets, road safety and/or CCTV installation? If so, then more work is needed to demonstrate that public safety extends beyond physical security infrastructure to broader questions of social cohesion and resilience. If the city does have a mandate that recognises this, does it cover the three commonly accepted levels of prevention (see the Introduction for an overview and Chapters 4-6 for more detail)? Does it address all forms of hate and extremism or is it limited to a specific threat or ideology? Does it allow for multi-agency cooperation and collaboration with civil society, communities and the private sector?

Where a city’s mandate is out of step with its needs in preventing hate, extremism and polarisation, it should look at ways to work with other levels of government to expand it and/or pursue creative solutions within existing mandates to maximise impact.

Developing a strategic framework

Any city needs to make a number of strategic considerations before implementing prevention programmes or initiatives in its communities. The end product will vary from city to city: it could result in a formal strategy document explicitly associated with preventing and responding to hate, extremism and polarisation, another formalised framework (for example, related to public safety, violence prevention or social well-being) or with no published strategy tied to them at all.

Some cities may be developing a strategy for the first time, while others could be looking to update, improve or otherwise change an existing strategy or approach. Whichever it is, a strategic framework should not merely outline what a city commits to doing; it should ultimately speak to the conceptual framing of a city’s approach to prevention. Cities should consider what works best for their particular challenges and circumstances, recognising that the proposed framework will need to be practical, achievable and measurable with their existing resources and local services.

Local officials and stakeholders will also need to be cognisant of the need in many cases to get approval from a mayor, council or other political body for their prevention strategy. Thus, the political message that could be signalled by adopting a particular approach should also be borne in mind. While prevention efforts and the strategies that frame them need to be depoliticised as far as possible, they do not exist in a political vacuum and in most if not all cases, they address issues that are contentious, if not also inherently political.

What is important is that there is awareness of the political and policy context during their development and an appreciation of how the involvement of local politicians or other policies is likely to be received differently across the community. Needless to say, it is critical that while such frameworks inevitably have a political context, they should not be used as political tools to attack or undermine political opponents. Many cities take their cue not only from what other cities are doing but from approaches endorsed by the United Nations or other international organisations.

Common examples of often inter-related frameworks include:

Public health: an interdisciplinary field that involves the organised efforts and informed choices of society, organisations, both public and private, communities and individuals. Such an approach seeks to address the causes of hate, extremism and polarisation by treating them at a societal level, as we would treat them pathologically in a medical setting. For more on how public health models can be applied to preventing hate and extremism, see here.

Violence prevention: specific to targeting manifestations of violence and preventing crime through education, mediation and other social means. There are many examples of violence prevention models adopted around the world. One of the best known is the Cardiff Model, developed in the United Kingdom as a public health approach and since tailored to applications in many other cities.

Community safeguarding and public safety: protection of the right to live in safety, free from abuse and neglect. This may encompass a broad variety of different approaches, including those developed for safeguarding children and adults as well as wider public safety approaches. For an overarching approach, see UN Habitat’s Safer Cities programme and the New Urban Agenda.

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): a dedicated framework for addressing the drivers which radicalise individuals to extremist- and terrorist-motivated violence and strengthen community resilience. These are often linked to or under the umbrella of national counter-terrorism strategies. For instance, Brčko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted a dedicated Action Plan for the implementation of the National Prevention and Fight Against Terrorism Strategy.

These frameworks need not be mutually exclusive and may be used in combination. Whichever approach(es) a city adopts, the frameworks should emphasise the following principles:

Do no harm: coming from the humanitarian and development fields, this notion indicates that an intervention should be mindful of unintended consequences and always improve, never deteriorate, a situation or pose harm to individuals or communities.
Gender-sensitivity: awareness and consideration of gender power dynamics and gender (in)equalities and the differential needs, experiences and status of men, women, girls and boys, sexual and gender minorities based on socio-cultural context while developing policy, planning or action. (Definition drawn from OSCE and UN Women sources)
Human rights: prevention and response should protect and promote human rights and individuals enshrined in international human rights instruments. This should not just be a statement; it must be considered at each stage of implementation and engagement.
Whole-of-society: effective prevention requires the participation of a diversity of government and non-government stakeholders, including government departments and public services spanning all relevant sectors and disciplines, as well as civil society, the private sector and community members. It should also not be limited to one specific agency alone without cooperation from others.

Additional Considerations

Consultation and input from communities, who might be considered ‘end users’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of the framework, should be sought throughout the development of the framework, including on the conceptual approach adopted and the key terminology included. More widely, a city’s strategy will likely be more effective and better supported if it offers a true reflection of the concerns, values and priorities of communities. For this, and many other reasons, building trust between cities and local communities, as well as with key agencies like the police that might fall outside the purview of the city but are a necessary partner, is a critical ingredient throughout every step of strategic planning and implementation.

Publishing the city’s strategy can help build trust with other actors and a city’s residents. It demonstrates a commitment to transparency and presents the city’s approach to build a shared understanding and invite engagement. To be effective, the strategy should be available in all relevant languages.

Harnessing Existing Approaches

A further challenge for approaches that focus heavily on radicalisation and counterterrorism is the assumption that these threats are perceived to be exceptional or inherently specific and thus requiring a distinct approach for addressing. In fact, cities tend to report better results where strategies for tackling these issues form part of broader, existing mechanisms and approaches and are better positioned to adopt an integrated, ‘mainstreamed’ approach to prevention. This also encourages cities to avoid siloed working and develop better multi-stakeholder collaboration. This does not mean that terrorism and extremism cases/challenges will not require specific interventions, but rather, that they should be considered and deployed in an integrated way. This is a key area in which many cities have expressed a need for increased support, including training and capacity-building (see Chapter 7).

Institutionalising the approach

Even if city-led prevention is based on multi-stakeholder cooperation, the first task is to identify a lead entity, office, individual or group of individuals (e.g., a task force or coordination unit) to oversee the implementation of the framework. Having an office or individual(s) that champions prevention – as an approach and a philosophy – across a city is important. In putting together this Guide, local government officials shared that key individuals had been critical in developing prevention in their city, influencing the approach of other agencies and winning the backing of their mayor or local political leaders.

As with much of prevention, there is no one-size-fits-all approach for how a city should organise itself to engage on these issues. Below are some options and considerations for each.

Individual lead agency/department

+ Pros: Provides a clear, unambiguous line of responsibility and accountability.

– Cons: Other agencies may feel less involved, and responsibility may fall unequally on a specific lead.

Considerations:

A further consideration here is whether a city appoints an existing agency/department as lead or creates a new unit, either as a standalone office or integrated within an existing agency/department. Resource constraints will also play some role in determining the course of action here.
The choice of which agency/department should lead may also signal a particular policy emphasis and cities need to be mindful of how such choices will be perceived in their communities and affect trust and cooperation from potential target groups due to perceived prejudices and/or past experiences.

Shared responsibility across multiple agencies/departments

+ Pros: Greater collective ownership and a clear expectation that prevention needs to be considered and contributed to by multiple agencies reflecting different functions and services that a city delivers.

– Cons: Risk of overlapping responsibilities, inconsistencies or competition between different agencies. Having multiple agencies per se is likely not the problem, but cities consulted on this felt challenges came when there were breakdowns in communication and cooperation (including around information sharing), for whatever reason, between different agencies.

City-wide network

A city-wide network brings together relevant agencies/departments, as well as CSOs and key community stakeholders. If a city’s mapping process at the outset has been comprehensive and involved participation from across the community as well as different departments and services, this network may already largely be in place. There are several approaches to pursuing a city-wide network, and some considerations for each:

Leverage an existing network: Many cities have already established thematic networks to address challenges facing local communities (e.g., to address ethnic/religious discrimination, integration issues or gender equality). These existing networks may be well placed to help address prevention-related issues and could be leveraged appropriately. A local peace commission, law and order committee, or public safety council are all examples from cities consulted for this Guide. Cities should be mindful not to over-burden existing networks, however; any change in their duties should be worked out collaboratively and include ongoing support and necessary resourcing and training.

Create a new network: If there are no relevant networks in place, it may be necessary to develop a new network dedicated to supporting prevention efforts in the city. Cities should be mindful that the framing of the issue will be crucial and must fully reflect the aspirations of external partners, including community stakeholders. If the subject is considered too specific or narrow or is overly securitised, it may undermine community-wide participation and limit long-term sustainability.

Form an expert group: Particularly on complex subjects where external expertise adds value, a city may want to consider including individuals with specific technical, professional or academic expertise alongside local services and community stakeholders. This could be done by including them in a prevention network together with other stakeholders, or by setting up a separate expert group or advisory committee.

For more on local prevention networks and other multi-stakeholder coordination models that can support or lead city-level prevention efforts, see Chapter 7.

Regardless of the model, the city has a responsibility to raise awareness of prevention priorities and approaches across the different parts of the local government and should have some involvement with any prevention network, even if just to facilitate meetings, coordinate different agencies or adopt recommendations. The wider city administration should also support a prevention network by offering infrastructure, human resources and funding, and by identifying existing mechanisms that might be leveraged to support prevention.

Sustainability

Once a city government has established the structures and networks to support effective prevention, there are several considerations to help ensure they can stay in place and continue working sustainably to achieve long-term impact.

Navigate political change

Achieving results from a city’s prevention approach requires long-term effort and investment, likely longer than a single mayoral or council term. Insulating the strategic approach from political changes, whether spurred by elections, new appointments or changes in ministerial responsibilities, requires working to achieve consensus and buy-in from key administrative staff.

This might include prioritising any departmental/agency leads who (a) may continue in post despite changes at the political or executive level and (b) are well positioned to embed prevention into existing/updated guidance, approaches and mechanisms for delivering wider services in the city. Incoming political leaders and administrations should be briefed if details on the city’s framework are not already part of the transition or handover discussions.

Secure a legal basis for a city’s framework

Not only can this further insulate a city’s approach from short-term political changes, but also puts the framework on a statutory footing that will likely also improve its potential to be embedded within the wider legal responsibilities of a city and potentially support efforts to raise financial and other resources, for example by requiring its inclusion in annual budgets. Passing a city council motion or amending existing legislation to make provisions for a prevention framework is discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to strengthening a city’s mandate, but it is also an important component of a city’s sustainability strategy.

Identify and sustain resourcing

It is not uncommon for a well-crafted prevention strategy to fail to deliver on its promise due to a lack of adequate resources. Considering that resources will always be limited and cities are often financially stretched to deliver existing public services, the question is often how to leverage existing resources to show results. If additional resourcing is required, then the challenge becomes how to mobilise it without adding a significant financial burden.

It is critical to consider all forms of resourcing that are necessary for the success of prevention efforts, including human, financial and material, such as infrastructure and facilities, as well as less tangible resources like skills, training, expertise and credibility.

All types of resources ultimately have financial implications (for example expertise requires training, which in turn requires a budget), but the impact can be limited by sharing the burden among different agencies. Given that cities already have policies and infrastructures in place, some resources can be (at least in part) mobilised by connecting with what already exists.

The following are examples from different global contexts of city departments that may be called upon to contribute to prevention efforts:

Crime prevention and public safety
Local democracy and citizen participation
Urban development and planning
Youth and education
Health and social care
Sports
Culture
Gender equality
Integration and migrant resettlement
Religious and ethnic harmony
Welfare
Housing

In 2019, the Mayor of Newark (New Jersey, USA), launched the Office of Violence Prevention & Trauma Recovery (OVPTR), and, in 2020, the mayor and City Council allocated 5% of the Public Safety budget to fund it. The OVPTR was established within the city’s existing public safety and public health mandate to coordinate a city-wide response to violence prevention that “improve[s] the quality of life for all residents of Newark through reimagining public safety and public health as tools to address the underlying causes of violence, not only its consequences.” The city government worked collaboratively with residents and community and local leaders to identify funding priorities and craft strategic goals.

It follows that preventing hate, extremism and polarisation will not necessarily need its own infrastructure, office, or staffing budget (see Institutionalising the Approach, above), but at a basic level it requires the same types of resources that other departments have access to.

If new resources are needed, a city might explore the following options (separately or in combination):

National government grants, budget allocation or other funding mechanisms: This might pose opportunities for cities whose national governments have adopted a national strategy on prevention. Several countries do have regular calls for proposals for prevention initiatives, but keep in mind that having an entire prevention infrastructure dependent on competitive grant funding, particularly if tied exclusively to the national government and its priorities, can pose sustainability challenges in the longer-term.
Dedicated line in city budget: This creates an expectation and a precedent for annual allocation, but it is also a demonstration of wider commitment and an important part of institutionalisation (see Institutionalising the Approach above).
International donors: Such opportunities vary considerably from country to country and from city to city. Funding procedures and application processes may be inaccessible to small cities that do not have the necessary staff or skills to formalise their projects. In many cases, an implementing partner which is not a government agency or other public body is needed. It may be important to consider both whether there is alignment between international donors’ priorities and those of a local community, and whether receiving support from a particular donor might affect community perceptions of a city’s prevention efforts. Except for Strong Cities, there are few examples of funding for training or capacity building on extremism and hate targeting local governments specifically. Most of this support is focused on central governments and/or CSOs.
Private sector partnerships: Some cities have successfully secured resources from the private sector, whether from local business owners and chambers of commerce, or from multinationals with a presence in their city. Often designed as public-private partnerships, resources can often be skills, expertise and facilities in addition to financial contributions. For example, New York City’s Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI) pursues tech-based solutions to some of the city’s most pressing challenges. To help mitigate the risks from misleading information, OTI works closely with social media platforms to track and flag problematic posts that could influence residents or incite violence.

The Shared Endeavor Fund

In 2019, the Mayor of London (United Kingdom), and MOPAC launched the first iteration of the Mayor’s Shared Endeavour Fund, a grassroots funding initiative dedicated to supporting hyper-local responses to hate crimes, violent extremism and related threats in London. To scale the support available, MOPAC sought out a private sector partner that could match the funds provided by City Hall. After outreach and engagement with multiple potential private sector partners, MOPAC partnered with Google.org, resulting in an £800,000 joint investment that supported more than 30 grassroots organisations across the city to build resilience within their communities.

Identify and sustain resourcing

To deliver against a city’s strategic framework, a city’s employees need a variety of skills and understandings that go beyond the technical expertise their role requires. If a city is committed to maintaining a cohesive and welcoming environment for its diverse residents, it should consider the kinds of capacities its employees need, especially those who work directly with the public or who can influence key policies or approaches. For example, in addition to the technical capacities police officers need to keep the city safe, anti-bias training improves officers’ engagement with communities and reduces discrimination complaints. Police are not the only officials who can benefit from training to better serve increasingly diverse populations. In Columbus (Ohio, USA) – home to the largest immigrant population in Ohio – city officials take part in cultural competency training to help ensure Columbus remains a ‘welcoming city’.

Targeted training is also important for front-line practitioners who are working with migrants and refugees. In São Paolo (Brazil) the Municipal Plan of Policies for Immigrants includes efforts to build the capacity of city officials on various aspects of migration management. The city trains municipal officials and community-based service providers to provide support to migrants and refugees in a way that respects their cultural and religious customs, as well as traditional health practices. The plan specifically prioritises training to enhance gendered competencies, for example, around working with women and LGBTQI+ migrants and refugees. The Plan also strengthens hate incident reporting by training staff who are monitoring reporting channels on relevant (coded) language used to express anti-migrant sentiment or incite violence.

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A Guide For Cities: Preventing Hate, Extremism & Polarisation

Chapter 3: Strategy

A city’s mandate

Local government prevention-related mandates in different countries

Key questions and considerations

Is the mandate sufficient?

Developing a strategic framework

Common examples of often inter-related frameworks include:

Additional Considerations

Institutionalising the approach

Individual lead agency/department

Shared responsibility across multiple agencies/departments

City-wide network

Sustainability

Navigate political change

Secure a legal basis for a city’s framework

Identify and sustain resourcing

The Shared Endeavor Fund

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A Guide For Cities: Preventing Hate, Extremism & Polarisation

Contents

Chapter 3: Strategy

A city’s mandate

Local government prevention-related mandates in different countries

Key questions and considerations

Is the mandate sufficient?

Developing a strategic framework

Common examples of often inter-related frameworks include:

Additional Considerations

Institutionalising the approach

Individual lead agency/department

Shared responsibility across multiple agencies/departments

City-wide network

Sustainability

Navigate political change

Secure a legal basis for a city’s framework

Identify and sustain resourcing

The Shared Endeavor Fund

Identify and sustain resourcing

Explore other similar resources

Shared Endeavour Fund: Call Four Evaluation Report

Transatlantic Dialogue Initiative: Ten Key Findings in 2024

Managing Migration: City-Led Approaches for Being an Inclusive, Welcoming and Socially-Cohesive City

Countering Hate Speech in Times of Crisis: Considerations for Mayors and Local Governments