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THE GCTF'S GOOD PRACTICES ON STRENGTHENING NATIONAL-LOCAL COOPERATION IN P/CVE

MAPPING THE IMPLEMENTATION, PROGRESS, GAPS, NEEDS AND PRIORITIES IN UGANDA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Defence Forces
CiSCAVE	Civil Society Coalition on Violent Extremism
CSO	civil society organisation
CT	counter terrorism
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPOD	Inter-party Organisation for Dialogue
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDAs	ministries, departments and agencies
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Center
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NLC	national-local cooperation
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NTC	National Technical Committee
P/CVE	preventing and countering violent extremism
PCF	Political Consultative Forum
UKCL	Uganda Kings and Cultural Leaders Forum
UNATU	Uganda National Teachers Union
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UPF	Uganda Police Force
VE	violent extremism

OVERVIEW

The Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF's) Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism (GCTF's NLC Good Practices)[1] aims to help countries operationalise a whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), which includes national and local government actors, government and non-governmental organisations and law enforcement and non-law enforcement practitioners. The GCTF based its development of these good practices on the recognition that enhanced cooperation between national and local actors can facilitate the local application of international, regional and national P/CVE frameworks and programmes.[2]

The 13 Good Practices

1 Identify the barriers or other challenges to national-local P/CVE cooperation.

2 Identify, delineate and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE actors.

3 Lead an inclusive, consultative, multi-layered, national dialogue for P/CVE.

4 Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE and/or related frameworks that reflect the perspective of the diversity of national and local government and non-government actors.

5 Invest in local actors, frameworks and programmes.

6 Build and strengthen trust.

7 Facilitate appropriate information sharing between P/CVE while protecting privacy.

8 Enable and promote effective co-ordination, communication and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE national action plan and other relevant national frameworks.

9 Balance national leadership and local ownership in P/CVE.

10 Encourage sustainable funding to support local implementation of national P/CVE and/or related frameworks.

11 Provide or otherwise support tailored training and other capacity building to support implementation of these national frameworks.

12 Ensure there is sustainable political support for P/CVE.

13 Enable effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE initiatives.

The analysis and recommendations contained in this report are informed by interviews with and surveys of more than 50 national, local, government and non-government stakeholders in Uganda, as well as an in-person workshop involving some 20 national and local government officials and civil society actors from Uganda held on 25 October 2022.

The report assesses capacities, challenges, policies, programmes and activities taking place in Uganda in relation to P/CVE-related national-local co-operation (NLC), using the GCTF's NLC Good Practices as a point of reference. It then provides recommendations for strengthening national-local and broader P/CVE-related cooperation throughout the country. The recommendations are illustrative rather than comprehensive and are aimed at providing entry points for discussions to enhance NLC as part of a wider effort to operationalise and sustain a whole-of-society approach to P/CVE in Uganda.

Key takeaways

1 Uganda recently elaborated a national P/CVE strategy and an accompanying 11-point plan of action. However, the document is not publicly available, leaving few Ugandans aware of its existence, let alone its content. Moreover, although there is an office – the National Technical Committee (NTC) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) – responsible for

overseeing strategy implementation, it is under-resourced, particularly when compared with the agencies involved in overseeing the implementation of Ugandan counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. Moreover, the national government does not allocate funding for locally led P/CVE activities. As a result, all such activities are funded by international donors and development partners, with the projects often being driven by the interests of external stakeholders rather than those of local communities.

2 Uganda's elaborate decentralisation structures offer advantages for facilitating and strengthening NLC. However, the national government's centralised and securitised approach to countering terrorism has increasingly limited the mandate and ability of local authorities to respond to the needs of their communities or address local conflicts. This has impeded their ability to contribute to P/CVE efforts, reinforcing the notion the mandate for P/CVE rests exclusively with the national government.

3 The state-centric approach to P/CVE fuels perceptions of the threat of violent extremism (VE) as a national problem. This in turn undermines NLC and diminishes chances of a structured dialogue involving national and local actors. Instead, P/CVE is perceived by some as a ploy for the security sector to justify it being given the largest share of the national budget.[1]

4 Security agencies often apply CT policies and tools against (non-violent) extremist groups, Muslim communities and political opposition leaders. This has eroded trust, particularly between local communities and security forces, undermining NLC efforts. Because P/CVE is largely seen through a security paradigm, there is a perception that any form of collaboration with national actors is contributing to a further securitisation of the approach.

5 Cross-cutting structural problems, including poverty, poor management of natural resources, and corruption, have both helped fuel extremist violence and hindered nationwide collaborative efforts to address the conditions conducive to its spread.

6 Nearly everyone interviewed for this report believe that P/CVE-related cooperation between national and local actors is either limited or non-existent. One of the major hurdles to NLC remains the absence of an institutionalised framework – let alone mechanism(s) to implement it – for dialogue and cooperation between national and local actors to be able to develop and implement coherent and complementary local P/CVE programmes. In the absence of a co-ordination mechanism, national and local institutions and organisations working on P/CVE-related activities largely operate independently of each other, often competing and acting in self-interest to be prominent and seen as active.

7 Community policing activities of the Uganda Police Force (UPF) can provide opportunities for inclusive dialogue to strengthen P/CVE-related NLC – including through town hall meetings and community watch teams. However, the UPF and other security actors lack the necessary P/CVE knowledge and skills to leverage these opportunities.

8 No sustained P/CVE capacity-building programmes are reported in Uganda, and the few short-term training seminars and workshops intended to advance P/CVE efforts in the country are not seen as having contributed to P/CVE or related policy discussions or changes in the public or private sectors.

9 Political will at the national level to prevent and counter VE appears to be increasing, as evidenced, for example, by the recent elaboration of a national P/CVE strategy in Uganda. However, there is limited focus on prevention in practice, whether through dialogue, resilience building or social-economic interventions in marginalised or affected communities. Moreover, because of the heavy involvement of national security agencies and actors in P/CVE, information about relevant activities is often classified and thus not shared with local government and civil society actors.

10 Civil society organisations (CSOs) in Uganda are involved in implementing local P/CVE activities. They are well versed in local-level drivers of and dynamics surrounding VE and are well placed to cultivate local partnerships and ownership of local P/CVE efforts. However, competition for limited funding opportunities has created few incentives for strengthening intra-CSO cooperation and communication. This contributes to a lack of clarity among CSOs as to their appropriate role(s) in P/CVE efforts.

11 The NTC appears committed to expanding and deepening engagement with local governments and CSOs across the country. However, these interactions seem so far to be largely limited to creating awareness about the national P/CVE strategy and have yet to include essential local actors, such as cultural and religious leaders, and representatives from political parties and informal sector groups. Where such interaction exists, it is not formally organised or recorded, and in other cases it is security or intelligence-led, especially when threats or incidents have been reported.

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Context

Uganda is experiencing increasing threats and concerns over VE. These are reported to be linked to the Allied Defence Forces (ADF),[3] al-Shabaab, and other extremist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS.[4] There are also local armed groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) operating in certain parts of the country. Since the 2010 bombing in Kampala that killed 74 people,[5] terrorist attacks have killed or wounded many Ugandans, as well as damaged property and disrupted public peace.[6]

The UPF also reports the existence of terrorist sleeper cells in Ntoroko, Luwero, Kampala, Bundibugyo and Kanungu. It often cautions the general public to be vigilant and report any suspicious activities. However, some Muslim leaders, associations and human rights activists have condemned the heavy-handed military responses of government agencies following these attacks as promoting the terrorist cause, since they often disproportionately target and discriminate the Muslim community under cover of countering violent extremism.[7] Some of the attacks are reported to have been carried out by non-Muslim terrorist operatives using Muslim names to attract further oppression.[8] Government-led initiatives to tackle the drivers of recruitment to VE remain rare and any such initiatives typically fail to address the stigmatisation of affected communities. The situation is exacerbated by differences among ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) – including security agencies, community leaders and CSOs – over the interpretation of the problem; overlapping mandates; the lack of and competition for otherwise meagre resources; capacity gaps; and the absence of meaningful P/CVE-related NLC.

At the national level, terrorism has been consistently promoted as a threat to national security.[9] However, this is perceived in some circles as a ploy to suppress a growing discontent that threatens the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and to help extend the regime's control of the state.[10] This helps explain the prioritisation of strong capabilities of CT agencies such as the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in addressing the threat, and why local political authorities, CSOs and other non-security actors do not participate.

Because P/CVE is largely seen through a national security paradigm and often conflated with CT, there is a perception that any form of collaboration with national actors is contributing to a further

securitisation of the approach. At the same time, the mandate and reported activities of the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD) and the Political Consultative Forum (PCF), both formed to craft a political direction for the country, are silent on P/CVE.

As in a number of other contexts, livelihood pressures, which are exacerbated by widespread poverty and corruption, can breed frustration, and enhance the appeal for some in marginalised communities of violent extremist groups that can offer economic incentives for joining them.[11] The population in Uganda is currently estimated at over 43 million and is projected to reach 51 million in the next five years.[12] This growth has not been matched with social-economic growth and development and has been marked by increasing pressure on land, climate change and the lack of skills to improve decreasing agricultural yields. All of this further contributes to rising levels of poverty.[13]

FINDINGS FOR EACH GCTF NLC GOOD PRACTICE

1 **Identify the barriers or other challenges to NLC**

This good practice emphasises the need to first understand the barriers to P/CVE-related NLC. In Uganda these include:

- politicisation and securitisation of P/CVE
- enduring identity-based grievances and conflict
- political intolerance
- poor management of natural resources
- unemployment and historical vulnerability to violence.

Politicisation and securitisation of P/CVE

As evidenced by the 2022 attacks by the ADF which killed nine people, terrorism continues to pose a threat to communities across Uganda.[14] Nevertheless, some have accused the government of politicising terrorism and CT to target Muslim communities and political opponents. Human rights advocates also report that Muslims are often targeted for discriminatory treatment by security agencies.[15] During the

mapping, concerns were voiced about the tendency of the government to associate VE with a single religion (Islam) and its reluctance to apply this label on similar acts committed by members of other faithgroups.[16]

Enduring identity-based grievances and conflict

Uganda is home to a multi-religious[17] and multi-ethnic population, where identities influence the formation and leadership of political organisations and processes, access to national and local resources, as well as cooperation between national and local actors on agendas involving communities and the state in Uganda. Some identity groups, especially religious and tribal communities, experience enduring grievances over injustice, and exclusion from and discrimination in political processes and economic opportunities across various regimes. The major ethnic groups in Uganda are Baganda (16.5%), Banyankole (9.6%), Basoga (8.8%), Bakiga (7.1%), Iteso (7%), Langi (6.3%), Bagisu (4.9%), Acholi (4.4%), Lugbara (3.3%) and other (32.1%). This configuration shapes processes of differentiation and determines the distinction between regime insiders and outsiders.[18] It helps to explain why, for example, the Baganda ethnic majority perceives itself to be constantly outbid for power and resources by the non-Baganda political majority. Existing differences along ethnic lines are often invoked to explain perceptions of exclusion, discrimination and injustice, which undermines efforts to mobilise whole-of-society P/CVE efforts.

Political intolerance

Political intolerance helps fuel a highly centralised governance system, as indicated by responses during the survey and in-person interviews. For example, one respondent stated: "Political differences are undermining our collective efforts in Uganda to deal with this [VE as a] national problem."[19] The NRM's domination of political power for over 35 years, while using the military or constitutional amendments to repress the political opposition, underscores the sustained nature of the intolerance to ensure protection and continuity of the political regime.

Most government decisions are only informed by a political system, where a single political party remains dominant through repression and suppression of opposition political activities, especially at local level.[20] This contributes to the high levels of mistrust, but also often a sense of resignation by the electorate that cooperation with the state is fruitless. This is a growing experience within and among political parties and their supporters.[21] During the elections, political supporters are mobilised and sometimes radicalised to counter such repression.[22] P/CVE-related NLC efforts are impeded when the political regime itself lacks the incentives and approach to build cooperation across political divides at national and local levels.

Poor management of natural resources

Poor management of natural resources compromises the potential for co-ordination and cooperation between national and local actors. Communities are fighting over land ownership, access to Lake Victoria for transport and fishing, forests, oil, and other deposits of commercially viable minerals. For example, land grabbing and evictions at the hands of politicians, courts, influential elites and security actors, and dispossession from access to water and forests, have produced hundreds of displaced individuals and families.[23] Grievances over the management of development opportunities undermine the trust and creation of co-ordination opportunities necessary for national and local actors to collaborate, including on P/CVE. The lack of co-ordination mechanisms involving local authorities, civil society and local communities to facilitate effective management of natural resources is a barrier to P/CVE-related NLC.

Unemployment and historical vulnerability to violence

The National Youth Policy recognises that the lives of millions of Ugandans are marked by poverty; inadequate education, skills, work and employment opportunities; exploitation; disease; civil unrest; and gender discrimination.[24] Youth have continued to play a central role in various manifestations of violence,[25] including VE.[26] Vulnerability to recruitment and attraction to perpetrate violence is amplified by the uncertainty of opportunities to improve livelihoods, historical narratives that motivate and legitimise violence in response to discrimination, injustice, exclusion and deepening disengagement from participation in civic life. Under such circumstances, and so long as the government is not

addressing local grievances, many of those interviewed for this report cautioned that local actors will be reluctant to share information or otherwise cooperate with national actors on P/CVE matters.

2 Identify, delineate and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE actors

This good practice concerns the need to elaborate and respect the comparative advantages of different national and local P/CVE stakeholders

At **the national level**, P/CVE efforts are dominated by national security agencies, with few, if any, non-security government institutions involved. For example, the MIA is the principal entity responsible for coordinating P/CVE policies and programmes. It houses the NTC, which was established to oversee the implementation of the national P/CVE strategy. Although not involved in implementing the P/CVE framework, the NCTC within the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs oversees Uganda's CT efforts. The bifurcation of P/CVE and CT between the NTC and the much more influential and better resourced NCTC complicates efforts to align P/CVE and CT approaches, both of which leave little space for local actors to participate.

The NCTC is currently better financed, more institutionalised and therefore more present and otherwise active across the country than the NTC, particularly at local level. Most local actors seem to be unaware of the existence of a national P/CVE strategy. Moreover, the survey responses highlight the disconnect in awareness and participation at local level between the NTC and local actors, and the more centralised and security-centric CT strategy implemented by the NCTC. CT is exclusive to security agencies, to the extent that even national-level political leaders are often unaware of what is going on, undermining their ability to cooperate around CT or P/CVE. This lack of participation contributes to a lack of cooperation.

Prioritisation of CT over P/CVE by the national government is highlighted in the disparity in resources allocated to them by the government. Numerous legislative and programming frameworks have been adopted to facilitate financing of CT activities, often funded by international donors and delivered in an unsynchronised manner by different security agencies (e.g., the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force, the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, the Internal Security Organisation), which operate in silos.[27] Meanwhile, the MIA lacks a budget line or dedicated resources to implement the national P/CVE strategy.

> **"Prioritisation of CT over P/CVE by the national government is highlighted in the disparity in resources allocated to them by the government."**

Uganda has an elaborate decentralised system of government, which envisages a significant role for **local government authorities**. This system – at least in theory – offers opportunities for P/CVE-related and wider NLC through existing national, district, country, sub-county, parish and village local government structures designed to respond to local needs and interests.[28]

However, the key challenge is that constitutional amendments in 2005 re-centralised the decision-making authority delegated to local governments with the appointment by the national government of chief administrative officers in localities across the country.[29] As a result, local governments have become weakened from a lack of binding decision-making authority to respond to local needs or resolve local conflicts.

Local governments, extending from district to county, sub-county, parish and village levels, can facilitate greater NLC. However, they are perceived to have failed in their role to deliver services and drive more local conflicts, e.g. between elected and appointed officials,[30] which would also undermine the strengthening of NLC.

Although at times alleged by the government to be representing foreign interests and supporting opposition political activities in the country,[31] CSOs are generally allowed to operate at national and community levels. They are able to provide a wide range of services, especially at local level, thus presenting important opportunities for P/CVE. While national-level CT efforts are conducted exclusively by the government, CSOs have been allowed to operate in the local P/CVE space to research, train and engage with the vulnerable, victims and allegedly extremist groups.

Local P/CVE work is monitored as part of the work of district security committees, chaired by the resident district commissioner appointed and reporting directly to the President, and other internal security agencies. The resulting suspicious and hostile relationship, caused by the overbearing influence and control of local affairs by the committee, undermines cooperation among CSOs, the central government and communities over P/CVE.[32] However, since 2019, Uganda's NTC has begun to engage CSOs to implement the national P/CVE strategy. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) facilitated a CSO-related dialogue in Uganda, which – among other things – discussed CSO representation on the NTC.

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CSOs continue to play an important role in implementing P/CVE initiatives at local level. Several CSOs, such as the Allied Muslim Youth Uganda,[33] conduct local-level P/CVE consultations, workshops and dialogue sessions, with the support of Western embassies in Uganda and international organisations. These activities are also opportunities to help scale up local cooperation on P/CVE to the national level.

Similarly, religious organisations such as the Muslim Centre for Justice and Law have conducted workshops and dialogue sessions to enhance access to justice for the poor and marginalised, particularly in selected VE-affected Muslim communities in Bugiri, Butambala, Kampala, Mayuge, and Mpigi districts. The Uganda Muslim Youth Development[34] undertakes P/CVE-related dialogues, training and research, which includes a focus on the role of women and enhancing the safeguarding responsibilities of fathers to strengthen the resilience of families against radicalisation. The Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, with support from the International Development Research Cooperation, also conducted dialogue sessions in VE-affected Gulu, Kampala and Mayuge districts.[35] The participants included CSO leaders, representatives from cultural institutions, journalists and youth activists, seeking to amplify youth voices and facilitate peer-to-peer learning.

Religious and cultural institutions in Uganda hold positions of great influence and authority among their members and at the national level. This leaves them well placed to play an important role, not only in facilitating intercultural, religious and/or communal dialogues that can contribute to building trust and social cohesion, but in P/CVE more broadly. Examples of such institutions include the Uganda Kings and Cultural Leaders Forum (UKCL)[36] and the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda.[37] With their extensive reach and influence, these institutions could influence and contribute more broadly to P/CVE

efforts. However, many have expressed concerns about exclusion from decision-making processes where they feel they are well placed to support national and local programmes.[38]

Although not yet engaged in P/CVE efforts, **the private sector** has been impacted by the rising levels of VE. The business community has experienced infiltration and exploitation by extremist groups to finance their activities.[39] The free market activities, e.g. cross-border trade, foreign exchange trade and mobile money services, created to increase access to economic opportunities, have been abused by extremist groups such as the ADF when funds are transferred to finance terrorist activities.

Private sector actors, including those funded by corporate social responsibility programmes, can develop and implement standards and good practice frameworks that enhance human rights, and expand and deepen stakeholder engagement, to help to reduce the risk of VE.[40] In Uganda, for example, the Kampala City Traders Association could contribute by reaching out to business communities to share lessons and expertise to leverage their comparative advantages in P/CVE.

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3 **Lead an inclusive, consultative, multi-layered national dialogue on P/CVE**

This good practice encourages a process involving a diversity of national and local stakeholders to develop, update and/or facilitate the implementation of a national P/CVE or related framework. Such a process could, *inter alia*, help align threat perceptions of the different stakeholders, and identify existing relevant plans, programmes, stakeholders, capacities and resources (at the national and local level) for P/CVE

Despite the existence of a national P/CVE framework, no such dialogue has taken place in Uganda. That said, the NTC did organise two workshops with select CSOs in Kampala and Mukono to further validate some aspects of the national P/CVE strategy. However, there have yet to be any consistent efforts to facilitate inclusive P/CVE dialogue or activities that involve both national and local leaders, although national officials have recently indicated their intention to undertake such efforts.

4 **Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE framework that reflects the perspectives of a diversity of national, local government and non-government actors.**

The national P/CVE strategy was developed in 2017 by the NTC, which is composed mainly of civil servants and security personnel. The United Nations Development Programme resourced the effort, which was based on IGAD's regional P/CVE strategy.[41] This process involved consultations with select local district governments and security officers, leaders of cultural and religious institutions, government departments and agencies, and CSOs. To this extent, the national P/CVE strategy recognises and sought to advance a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to P/CVE.

The strategy's action plan contains 11 strategic areas to guide P/CVE interventions, including establishing a national coordinating centre for P/CVE to oversee implementation, monitoring and evaluation:

1. promoting and strengthening governance and human rights

2. detecting, identifying and disrupting violent extremists

3. strengthening the rule of law and access to justice

4. regulating and monitoring electronic and print media

5. economic empowerment

6. developing a P/CVE communications strategy

7. strengthening multi-stakeholder cooperation, co-ordination and information sharing

8. deepening regional and international cooperation

9. identifying and providing support to vulnerable groups and individuals

10. building and strengthening partnership between state and non-state actors

11. empowering communities.

However, like the strategy itself, the action plan is not publicly available, leaving many local and other non-security actors unaware of its existence. In fact, nearly 75% of survey respondents either said they were unaware of the existence of the strategy or that one did not exist.[42] As noted earlier, beyond the lack of transparency, there is no budget line to facilitate implementation.

5   Investing in local actors, frameworks and programmes

This good practice encourages states to focus more attention on developing the local infrastructure, capacities, skills and resources to allow for more local-level P/CVE contributions.

> **"The national P/CVE strategy has yet to be complemented by any investments in the development of local P/CVE plans or programmes consistent with a whole-of-society approach."**

In parallel to the P/CVE strategy, there are a number of national-level CT frameworks.[43] Local frameworks are lacking, however, and the national P/CVE strategy has yet to be complemented by any investments in the development of local P/CVE plans or programmes consistent with a whole-of-society approach. The NTC could drive investment in and oversee the design and implementation of these local frameworks and activities. However, it lacks the necessary funding, personnel (apart from a dedicated P/CVE focal point) or facilities to do so.

The majority of investment in local actors, frameworks and programmes comes from international development donors and is directed at CSOs. However, the selection and funding of any CSOs are

typically based on donor guidelines and priorities in the country, and not on a coherent strategy or framework informed by the needs and priorities of local authorities or communities.

Development partners[44] established the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) to allow for more coherence and harmonisation among development activities. However, the DGF does not include P/CVE programmes and donors continue to support selected CSOs' P/CVE activities individually and not under the facility.[45] The DGF has also faced various challenges with the national government, including suspension for funding what were labelled anti-government programmes implemented by CSOs and political opposition leaders, and has only recently resumed work in Uganda.[46] Many CSOs were affected, including those claiming to provide critical services and access to development that the national government remains unable to provide.[47]

With IGAD's support, the Civil Society Coalition on Violent Extremism (CiSCAVE) has built an extensive membership of organisations, institutions and associations. The coalition implements a range of activities and provides a platform for networking, peer-to-peer reflection, sharing good practices and building relationships among CSOs of different levels and sizes across Uganda. Other activities include capacity building for P/CVE programmes; engagement with government, regional and international bodies to contribute to P/CVE policies and programming; monitoring the government's performance on related programmes; and cooperation with regional and international bodies to achieve these goals. However, CiSCAVE does not track or seek to harmonise CSO-led P/CVE programmes. Nevertheless, it does provide a collaboration framework that can strengthen P/CVE-related NLC, including by facilitating interconnected and locally contextualised cooperation and partnerships in Uganda, with the potential to bring cross-cutting agendas and approaches to inform national- and regional-level responses to P/CVE.

6 Build and strengthen trust

This good practice recognises that the effectiveness and sustainability of P/CVE efforts require, *inter alia*, a modicum of trust between and among different stakeholders involved in implementing the relevant policy or programme. It further elaborates some ways in which this trust can be developed and enhanced.

> **"Trust between the government and local communities in Uganda is low. Despite various policies and laws developed to fight corruption across the different levels of government, corruption remains widespread"**

Trust between the government and local communities in Uganda is low. Despite various policies and laws developed to fight corruption across the different levels of government, corruption remains widespread in Uganda.[48] It represents a significant barrier to building the trust needed for strengthening the NLC required to operationalise and sustain a whole-of-society approach to P/CVE.

With levels of trust in government low, some communities perceive the national government to be exploiting P/CVE for political gains in order to achieve political goals and ensure regime longevity. Such a perception can impede the willingness of these communities to collaborate with the national government on or contribute to P/CVE. Moreover, even efforts to build or restore trust in government tend to be state-centric, and seek to accommodate elites in government to help suppress and weaken political opposition.[49]

By comparison, CSOs enjoy high levels of trust in local communities and often work with local actors to deliver services that the government would not provide for communities to meet their needs and interests. For example, 79% of CSOs in Uganda provide social services.[50] As a result, CSOs are well placed to build and strengthen trust across communities and facilitate dialogue between local communities and their governments around often sensitive P/CVE issues.

This broad reach in range of services and geographical scope puts CSOs in a better position than other P/CVE stakeholders not only to build nationwide local-level trust, but also for entry points for implementing and strengthening NLC in P/CVE across the country. For example, the NGO Forum, a platform of over 650 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating across the country at national and community levels,[51] could in theory coordinate and produce unity of effort, and also build the relationships necessary to facilitate cooperation around P/CVE among its members country wide. The donor-funded Forum conducts seminars, dialogues and workshops, and produces newsletters to share findings, lessons and expertise, while also discussing strategies to scale up the work and impact of their members. While implementation of most recommendations to improve the sector still faces many challenges, the NGO Forum's extensive network can play an important role in enhancing national and local cooperation through its membership to advance P/CVE-related NLC.

In addition to corruption, the national government's mistreatment of CSOs by security agencies and officers during VE-related engagements or through blanket restrictions placed on NGOs in Uganda, is another obstacle to developing the trust between local communities and the central government needed to operationalise a whole-of-society approach to P/CVE.

> **"CSOs enjoy high levels of trust in local communities and often work with local actors to deliver services that the government would not provide for communities to meet their needs and interests"**

7 Facilitate appropriate information sharing between P/CVE actors while protecting privacy

This good practice underscores the importance of elaborating clear information-sharing guidelines or other frameworks and principles that outline how, when and what to share, with whom, as well as oversight and independent review processes.

There is no mechanism or protocol in Uganda dedicated to facilitating information sharing between national and local actors on P/CVE or related issues, and even ad hoc attempts at sharing information between national and local actors related to P/CVE are impeded by the overly broad definition of terrorism adopted by the government after 11 September 2001, which includes 'violations of national objectives and interests'.[52] Moreover, existing non-P/CVE information-sharing frameworks are sector-concentrated (e.g. security, CSO), leaving no space for the type of cross-sectoral information sharing that is often required in the P/CVE space.

The state has applied the overly broad definition against political opposition and other actors considered to be detrimental to the security and development of the country.[53] With such a broad definition in place and concerns about security services' mistreatment of suspected 'terrorists', non-security stakeholders have been reluctant to share early warning or related information about individuals or threats with national security agencies.

On the other hand, the security agencies which have the lead on P/CVE and CT efforts are reluctant to share with those outside the national security architecture. Sharing is further impeded by the fact that information about implementing NCTC programmes is often classified and thus deemed not sharable with local-level political and CSO actors.

Moreover, the overly broad definition of terrorism has contributed to the reluctance of media companies and journalists to share information that might be relevant for P/CVE. In fact, a number of them claim to have been targeted by law enforcement agencies under the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002[54] for publishing news or information concerning political processes, which the government has construed, without evidence, as supporting or furthering the activities that may have any links to terrorism. Further, on several occasions, the military reportedly raided and ransacked the premises of media houses, and confiscated documents and computers in search of evidence that would implicate individual journalists and their employers under the Act.[55]

8. Enable and promote effective co-ordination, communication and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE national action plan or other relevant national framework

This good practice emphasises the need to encourage and facilitate the sharing of resources, knowledge, research and experience among national and local policymakers and practitioners, through a co-ordination mechanism or platform involving different levels of government and social sectors.

There is currently no mechanism in place to facilitate multi-stakeholder co-ordination, communication and collaboration relevant to implementing the national P/CVE strategy. However, there are a number of existing co-ordination platforms, processes or arrangements that involve a subset of P/CVE stakeholders, which could be leveraged for P/CVE purposes.

For example, the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development provides a framework through the NGO Bureau to register, regulate and support the efforts of CSOs and community-based organisations to work in communities in a range of fields, including P/CVE. The Office of the Prime Minister also collaborates with CSOs to work on peacebuilding and conflict management, especially in northern Uganda.[56] District probation officers and community development officers also coordinate with communities to, *inter alia*, support programmes related to the demobilisation and reintegration of insurgents and criminals, especially in areas affected by the LRA and ADF. Ministries of education, agriculture, public service, works etc. also have district- and community-level working groups and structures such as the sub-county and parish local councils.

These could be leveraged for P/CVE objectives. For example, they could facilitate the sharing of lessons and expertise between national and local actors to help build cooperation around local P/CVE programmes. However, the officials at these levels of government lack the mandate, skills and guidance necessary to act effectively on P/CVE.

Other avenues offer potential alternatives or co-ordination, communication and collaboration between national and local stakeholders. For example, while P/CVE is not currently within their mandate, both the highly respected UKCL and the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda have sufficient influence to facilitate the sharing among their members of lessons and expertise related to P/CVE and implementing the national P/CVE strategy in particular, while also enhancing local ownership of related activities.[57]

The Uganda National Teachers Union (UNATU) is a forum for all teachers in Uganda, operating in government, private, religious-founded and community-founded schools, where many P/CVE activities

could and should be implemented. With its ability to reach over eight million students and their teachers, UNATU also provides a potential platform for sharing relevant P/CVE lessons and expertise.

However, with the current absence of an appropriate co-ordination mechanism, national and local institutions and organisations working on P/CVE-related activities largely operate independently of and often compete with each other, acting in self-interest to be prominent and seen as active. Despite recent efforts by the NTC Focal Point to engage with MDAs and CSOs,[58] these interactions appear to have been largely limited to creating awareness about the national P/CVE strategy, which – as noted earlier – is not yet publicly available. Moreover, these engagements have yet to include critical local actors (e.g. cultural and religious leaders, and representatives from political parties and informal sector groups). Further, where such interactions occur, they are not formally organised or recorded, and are sometimes led by security or intelligence actors, especially when threats or incidents have been reported.

9   Balance national leadership and local ownership

This good practice concerns finding the appropriate balance between national leadership and local ownership of a national P/CVE framework. The framework should be marked by principles of partnership, cooperation and information flow; flexibility in implementation; the ability to create coherence and synchronicity among locally implemented projects while respecting the roles of local actors; the avoidance of stigmatisation of the programme beneficiaries; and the promotion of regular two-way communication between national and local actors.

In Uganda, the lack of awareness and transparency around the national P/CVE framework impedes efforts to implement this good practice. Moreover, national leadership on P/CVE cannot be traced against a centralised trail of authority, decision-making or management of related programmes, but can rather be identified by project or activity and through which local ownership is difficult to determine. Although there are a number of security actors involved in CT, including those under the leadership of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UDPF) (e.g., the NCTC), none have an explicit P/CVE mandate. Moreover, with the breadth of the UDPF's responsibilities at a local level – including providing security for the oil fields and infrastructure[59] – there is limited bandwidth for it to assume a role in P/CVE.

There is some local ownership of community-level P/CVE initiatives, led primarily by CSOs. These programmes include consultative meetings, research and capacity-building activities, as well as engagement of local community leaders and their members. However, there is little in the way of local ownership over, let alone awareness of, the national framework.

Moreover, ownership and leadership in the P/CVE space at even the local level is limited by competition for the few funding opportunities offered by donors, capacity gaps in implementing P/CVE projects and differences in mandates and controls set by particular donors.[60] This leaves CSOs able to cultivate local participation and ownership in discrete P/CVE activities, but unable to build the synergies and partnerships with each other that would allow them to influence the national-level P/CVE framework or activities.

10   Encourage sustainable funding to support local implementation of national P/CVE frameworks

Recognising the need to ensure sustainable funding for locally led efforts to prevent and counter VE, this good practice highlights various ways in which national and local governments can provide such support to local implementation of the national P/CVE framework.

The national government does not allocate funding for locally led P/CVE activities. Moreover, MDAs and local governments lack the technical and institutional mandates to organise and mobilise P/CVE funding, especially since they currently lack a mandate to do so. As a result, all such activities are funded by international donors and development partners. The absence of dedicated and sustainable funding streams at national and local levels to support P/CVE undermines NLC efforts and, more broadly, a whole-of-society approach to P/CVE.[61]

On the promising side, CiSCAVE could coordinate P/CVE activities among CSOs across the regions of the country, with a possibility to effectively track P/CVE funding patterns and consolidate these into a fund that can support NLC activities, among other priorities.

11 Provide or otherwise support tailored training and other capacity building

This good practice highlights the importance of building the P/CVE skills and knowledge of a wide range of national and local stakeholders. This can include training, providing resources, and establishing networks designed to improve effectiveness, promote professionalism and share good practices for programme design and evaluation.

Unfortunately, no sustained P/CVE capacity-building programmes are reported in Uganda,[62] and the few short-term training seminars and workshops intended to advance P/CVE efforts in the country do not appear to have contributed to P/CVE or related policy discussions or changes in the public or private sectors.

There is, however, a general recognition across government agencies and CSOs that institutional and personnel capacities for P/CVE need strengthening: many relevant national and local actors currently lack the necessary skill, knowledge and material resources to deal with the VE problem effectively.[63] Investments in capacity building to address the terrorist threats have focused on the security sector, with little attention being paid to local and other actors, which are critical for addressing the social, economic and political drivers of extremist violence in the country.

> **"Given the central role they play in P/CVE in Uganda at a local level, enhancing the capacities of CSOs is critical to advancing P/CVE efforts on the ground. However, international donors have yet to invest in such efforts beyond supporting discrete, short-term, ad hoc programmes"**

The national P/CVE strategy recognises prisons and remand centres as sites of vulnerability to radicalisation and VE, especially when jailed or otherwise detained terrorist offenders and their supporters are provided a captive audience of disaffected individuals to recruit without distractions. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through the Global Coordinator for the Joint Global Initiative, collaborates with some CSOs to conduct capacity-building workshops and disseminate information on P/CVE in Uganda prisons, while also supporting rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.[64] Despite the collaboration, CSOs recognise the need for tailored capacity building of prison officers and organisations to be able to support the management of violent extremist prisoners and prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons.

Given the central role they play in P/CVE in Uganda at a local level, enhancing the capacities of CSOs is critical to advancing P/CVE efforts on the ground. However, international donors have yet

to invest in such efforts beyond supporting discrete, short-term, ad hoc programmes such as a Hedayah-run national capacity-building workshop on preventing VE through education in Uganda.[65] Relatedly, Mercy Corps is to develop a P/CVE training manual to support P/CVE programmes and activities in government. This effort has yet to start and requires monitoring to understand how this will influence a shift in government responses to VE across its agencies. It may also require inclusive pedagogical approaches that emphasise multi-stakeholder training and capacity-building activities that enable the shared learning needed to bring sufficient collaboration to help strengthen P/CVE-related NLC.

12 Sustain political support for P/CVE efforts

Given the long-term and evolving nature of the challenge that VE presents, this good practice highlights the importance of ensuring that political support for P/CVE can be sustained at both national and local levels, particularly when there is a change in political leadership.

> **"Structural and endemic socio-economic conditions such as widespread corruption, poor service delivery, poverty, inequality, as well as uneven access to development resources, all provide barriers to addressing VE at national and local levels."**

There is some political will from the government towards P/CVE at the national level, as evidenced by the recent elaboration of the national strategy. However, in addition to the lack of resources and personnel dedicated to the strategy's implementation, Uganda's CT framework and its CT agencies do not include preventive elements or tools such as dialogue, resilience building and social-economic interventions in vulnerable or affected communities.

Structural and endemic socio-economic conditions such as widespread corruption, poor service delivery, poverty, inequality, as well as uneven access to development resources, all provide barriers to addressing VE at national and local levels. As mentioned in Good Practice 6, state actors will seek to accommodate elites in government to help suppress and weaken political opposition. In this way, influence is maintained through exercising a transactional leadership style that allows the leaders to enjoy political or material rewards in exchange for their loyalty.[66] This further weakens political opposition and the will necessary for implementing a whole-of-society approach that would benefit P/CVE-related NLC.

13 Enable the effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE initiatives

This good practice underscores the need to provide or facilitate targeted support to relevant national- and local-level P/CVE actors to understand what works and what does not when it comes to P/CVE. The premise here is that enhancing such understanding will also enhance the impact of, and public and funding support for, P/CVE policies and programmes.

The Deputy Director of Counter Terrorism in the UPF recently recognised monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as a missing element in CT and P/CVE in Uganda.[67] At the national level, there is nothing in place to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the national framework, let alone encourage

or facilitate national or local actors to conduct their own M&E on their discrete P/CVE initiatives. M&E practices appear limited to CT activities implemented by the security agencies involving the UPDF or the UPF, which undertake after action reviews and develop reports that describe how the operations achieved their objectives. While these reports help to determine defence investment priorities and inform security decisions, they are not publicly accessible. Therefore, their ability to inform public policy discussions and related P/CVE programming at either national or local levels is limited.

For CSO-implemented P/CVE activities, donors typically require the production of M&E reports. However, while the reports refer to project goals and how they have been achieved, the challenges faced and the impact generated, they are rarely informed by robust and standardised P/CVE-specific M&E practices, and are often not publicly available.

To help address this gap, the European Commission and RUSI-Europe conducted national training on P/CVE, with the participation of the NTC, NCTC and CSOs from Uganda and Kenya, to provide methods, tools and approaches to design, implement and evaluate P/CVE programming, and considered, among others, the M&E of P/CVE.[68] Such one-off, short-term programmes are not sufficient, however.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While Uganda has developed a national P/CVE strategy, it has not been made public and thus there is limited public awareness of it. Moreover, there appears to be no government funding to support its operationalisation nor a mechanism or platform to coordinate its implementation. Further, there is little evidence to show that this framework reflects the perspectives of local governments or CSOs in Uganda. Finally, it appears that the overly securitised and highly centralised and securitised approach to CT that is dominated by national security actors, endemic corruption and ongoing marginalisation continue to undermine the trust between national and local and security and non-security stakeholders that is needed to be able to implement the P/CVE framework at a local level.

Yet, the country's highly decentralised system of governance, with structures from the national to village level, and also its decentralised religious and cultural institutions (which engage with communities across the country), offer platforms which could serve to develop NLC on P/CVE issues. However, this requires, *inter alia*, ensuring that these structures and institutions have the necessary mandate, resources and capacities to engage in this space.

> **"CSOs are positioned to convene participatory and inclusive national- and community-level learning forums, dialogues and training activities, including around P/CVE issues, and to help create further awareness and integration in both new and ongoing national and local government programmes related to addressing VE in Uganda"**

Moreover, government and, especially, CSOs are positioned to convene participatory and inclusive national- and community-level learning forums, dialogues and training activities, including around P/CVE issues, and to help create further awareness and integration in both new and ongoing national and local government programmes related to addressing VE in Uganda.

Recommendations

These are some steps that could be taken to strengthen P/CVE-related NLC in Uganda.

❶ Conduct inclusive dialogues

- Conduct inclusive dialogues that involve NTC, NCTC and non-security national actors, as well as representatives from local government and CSOs, to integrate the national P/CVE and CT frameworks into an integrated and comprehensive strategy based on a shared understanding of the threat that should inform related programmes and activities towards a whole-of-society approach to P/CVE.

- The dialogues would help national and local actors to mitigate security and political pressures, and other factors that may undermine NLC; define roles and responsibilities for implementing the national P/CVE framework; develop multi-stakeholder programming leading to implementation at the local level; and ensure that perspectives of local actors are reflected throughout.

- Undertake national- and community-level dialogues to determine roles and define expectations to inform localised P/CVE programming and facilitate discussions among local leaders and communities to identify and address drivers of VE.

- Facilitate local government-led dialogues to incorporate the national P/CVE strategy into national, district and local government programmes targeting women, youth, education, environment, governance, poverty alleviation, corruption and other livelihood improvement activities. For example, capacity-building programmes implemented by district- and community-level working groups and structures, such as the sub-county and parish local councils, could be leveraged to facilitate multi-stakeholder co-ordination to implement the national P/CVE strategy, and hold regular meetings with communities to identify and address local issues and concerns related to VE.

❷ Move beyond a security-led approach to P/CVE

- Expand the mandates of national government forums such as the IPOD and PCF to provide politically inclusive platforms where political leaders and their manifestos can also work to strengthen cooperation with local actors on P/CVE matters.

- Leverage the IPOD to allow political leaders and their respective political parties to discuss and agree on a P/CVE agenda, which can be incorporated into their codes of conduct, to guide

stakeholders to avoid the perpetration of extremism and radicalisation of their supporters and to help rally political parties to commit to sharing lessons and expertise around P/CVE.

❸ Implement

- Conduct institutional- and community-level P/CVE resilience mapping to help determine VE vulnerabilities, and implement evidence-based strategies towards more effective and sustainable P/CVE interventions. These should, *inter alia*, support the implementation of tailored programmes to address existing vulnerabilities and increase the recurrence of impactful programmes, while mitigating the risk of further securitisation and exacerbating any existing perceptions of exclusion and marginalisation.

- Increase public awareness of the existence and content of the national P/CVE strategy and its accompanying plan of action, e.g., by making them widely accessible and convening a high-level multi-stakeholder event to launch them.

- Include budget lines dedicated to P/CVE programme development and implementation, particularly at the local level in relevant MDAs, including those outside the security sector.

- Develop and implement multi-stakeholder P/CVE programming linked to the national P/CVE framework to facilitate its implementation at the local level, build partnerships, and allocate roles and resources for implementing the embedded action plan, which contains the 11 priority areas for interventions and other programmes. Hold dialogue sessions to ensure that the action plan implementation approaches incorporate the perspectives of local actors, both governmental and civil society.

- Support implementation of initiatives seeking to build synergy and increase collaboration between formal and informal institutions and sectors, in the form of raising awareness and strengthening co-ordination through dialogue, public outreach, and other relevant and inclusive initiatives around P/CVE. The initiatives should benefit from consultations with and participation of local P/CVE and peacebuilding practitioners concerning what actually works in specific contexts, while avoiding what does not.

❹ Raise awareness and build capacity

- Support and build the capacity of CSOs, religious and cultural leaders, and institutions, to be able to participate and otherwise engage in national and local government policymaking discussions and programme development, and facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues that can contribute to P/CVE. For example, training should build skills for P/CVE advocacy, planning and project implementation; stakeholder engagement to mobilise political will and support; communication; and resource mobilisation and related practices to enhance cooperation between national and local actors.

- Raise awareness of the benefits of a whole-of-society approach to addressing VE, including through workshops, seminars and policy briefs across government MDAs, to help demystify P/CVE as solely a security matter, and promote the benefits of integrating P/CVE approaches into wider national and local government (non-security) programming. Aim integration at mainstreaming P/CVE into projects and activities to redress local grievances and conditions that breed the appeal of VE.

- Build capacity for a P/CVE early warning and early response system, to collect and analyse data on emergent VE risks, threats and vulnerabilities, and to create evidence-based opportunities for early P/CVE responses.

❺ Coordinate and share information

- Mandate and resource the NTC to serve as a multi-stakeholder co-ordination mechanism, which includes national and local actors, to guide investment in and oversee the implementation of

local P/CVE activities to help ensure alignment between local programmes and the national framework.

- Formalise information sharing through regular multi-stakeholder forums involving national and local security, political, civil society, cultural, religious, women and youth actors concerning P/CVE. A mechanism to facilitate discussions on the dissemination of information related to VE and P/CVE is needed to address existing information gaps – often fuelled by trust deficits between these sectors – which limit the complementarity between programmes and activities.

- Mandate and resource CiSCAVE to coordinate P/CVE activities among CSOs across the regions of the country and to track P/CVE funding patterns. Consider launching a public-private fund that can mobilise contributions from different sources and support local P/CVE activities, including those aimed at strengthening NLC.

❻ Research and document

- Given the evolving nature of the threat, sustained research and documentation of conditions, causes, manifestations and opportunities for NLC towards P/CVE is needed to ensure P/CVE policies, programmes and interventions are evidence-based and efforts to enhance P/CVE-related NLC focus on addressing the documented threats and vulnerabilities, supported by research. This can help de-politicise P/CVE conversations, which in turn can help reduce the trust-related barriers to enhancing NLC. Facilitate quality management of NLC towards effective co-ordination and implementation of P/CVE interventions, and their continuous improvement in planning and impact.

- Support the culture of information sharing and exchange across national and local governments, MDAs of government, civil society and local governments.

ENDNOTES

1   P. Romaniuk and T. Durner. 2018. 'The Politics of Preventing Violent Extremism: The Case of Uganda', Conflict, Security and Development, 18(2):159-179.

2   This mapping has involved an assessment of human and material resources, systems and structures, programmes, projects, measures and activities implemented, laws and policies, strategies and key stakeholders, and other P/CVE-related information.

3   P. Nantulya. 2019. 'The Ever Adaptive Allied Democratic Forces Insurgency'. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-ever-adaptive-allied-democratic-forces-insurgency/. The ADF is a merger of three rebel groups — Allied Democratic Movement, National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, and Uganda Muslim Liberation Army.

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5   X. Rice. 2010. 'Uganda Bomb Blasts Kill at Least 74'. Guardian, 12 July. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks

6   Mahtani. 2021. 'The Uganda Attacks and Their Regional Implications'.

7   NTVUganda. 2016. 'News Night: Imam Idi Kasozi on Police Unfairly Targeting Muslims in Terrorism Investigations'. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aicg8_u7X-M.

8   Africa Portal. 2020. 'The Question of Marginalization and Vulnerability to Violent Extremism in Uganda'. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/PCVE_Brief_Uganda_Second_Series.pdf.

9   Ibid.

10   International Crisis Group. 2017. 'Uganda's Slow Slide into Crisis'. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/256-ugandas-slow-slide-crisis.

11   According to The Uganda National Household Survey 2019/2020,, the overall number of people living in absolute poverty increased from 8 million to 8.3 million, with regional and sub-regional variations throughout. See Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2021. The Uganda Na tional Household Survey 2019/2020, page 114.

12   Statista. 2022. 'Uganda: Total population from 2017 to 2027'. https://www.statista.com/statistics/447679/total-population-of-uganda/

13   S. Klasen and D Lawson. 2007. 'The Impact of Population Growth on Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda', Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 133, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, Göttingen.

14   E. Young et al. 2019. Violent Extremism in Eastern Uganda: Building Resilience in Civil Society (BRICS).

15   Ibid.

16   For example, a religious leader stated, "The Lord's Resistance Army is a terrorist organisation but they are not Muslims. But not all Christians are targeted and profiled by the state, it is just not fair." Interview with a Muslim religious leader, 19 July 2022.

17   As of 2022, the composition of Uganda's multi-religious population is Protestant 45.1% (Anglican 32.0%, Pentecostal/Born Again/Evangelical 11.1%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.7%, Baptist 0.3%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, Muslim 13.7%, other 1.6%, none 0.2% (2014 est.). See: The World Factbook. 2022. 'Uganda'. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/uganda/.

18   H. Alava and J.S. Sentongo. 2016. 'Religious (De)politicisation in Uganda's 2016 Elections', Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10(4): 677-692.

19   Interview with a CSO leader, 11 July 2022.

20   N. Stremlau. 2018. 'The National Resistance Movement and the Decline of Political Ideology'. In Media, Conflict, and the State in Africa (99-111). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

21   M. Khisa. 2015. 'Political Uncertainty and its Impact on Social Service Delivery in Uganda', Africa Development Journal, 40(4): 159-188.

22   D.M. Mubiru. 2021. 'Challenges of Ugandan Political Parties'. Independent, 1 July. https://www.independent.co.ug/challenges-of-ugandan-political-parties/.

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25   Peace Insight. 2020. 'Uganda'. https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/uganda/conflict-profile/.

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28   For example, at Local Council I, a village council of nine elected political leaders constitutes an executive committee in which the women, youth and disabled people are represented, governed by a chairman, and covers between 50 and 70 households with approximately 250–800 residents.

29   L. Nabaho. 2013. 'Recentralization of Local Government Chief Administrative Officers Appointments in Uganda: Implications for Downward Accountability'. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, 13/14. November

30   E.D. Green. 2008. 'Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda', Conflict, Security and Development, 8 (4): 427-450.

31   Reuters. 2010. 'Uganda Suspends Work of 54 NGOs, Increasing Pressure on Charities'. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-suspends-work-54-ngos-increasing-pressure-charities-2021-08-20/.

32   J. Hitchen and S. Muhereza. 2022. Uganda's Sub-National 'Presidents': Understanding the Evolution, Role and Function of Resident District Commissioners. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Uganda and South Sudan. https://www.kas.de/documents/280229/19027796/Understanding+the+evolution%2C+role+and+function+of+RDCs.pdf/06b9f140-66c1-511f-c3d0-743fde71ffaf?t=1656149105985.

33   Interview with the Director. 26 July 2022.

34   Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum. https://umydf.org/.

35   Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa. 2019. Youth Inclusive Mechanisms for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the IGAD Region: Learning Alliance (LEA) Workshop Report August 16-18, 2019. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/59195/IDL-59195.pdf.

36   Uganda Kings and Cultural Leaders Forum. http://www.bunyoro-kitara.org/94.html.

37   Inter-Religious Council of Uganda. n.d. 'Uganda National Dialogue Process'. https://www.ircu.or.ug/uganda-national-dialogue-process/.

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40   S.M. Ahmad, S. Liaquat and A. Rana. 2019. 'Connecting the Dots: Countering Violent Extremism through Corporate Social Responsibility'. Sustainable Development Policy Institute. https://www.think-asia.org/handle/11540/10171?show=full

41   Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. 2018. Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. https://cve.igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/The-IGAD-Regional-Strategy-for-Preventing-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf .

42   For example, one religious leader said, "These are national processes and documents, and not everyone should know about them, so I don't know about them." Interview with a religious leader, 18 July 2022.

43   This includes the Amnesty Act, the Anti-Terrorism Act and related operations, and the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).

44   Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

45   During interviews, a respondent observed, "There is lots of funding to fight terrorism in Uganda, but no funding to help prevent it. We have to keep talking to these embassies to see if anyone has a funding line for this work." Interview with a CSO leader, 22 July 2022.

46   The Independent. 2022. 'Museveni gives DGF five months'.
       https://www.independent.co.ug/museveni-gives-dgf-five-months/

47   Monitor. 2021. 'Government deals heavy blow to NGOs'.
       https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/government-deals-heavy-blow-to-ngos-3279838

48   In 2020, Uganda ranked 142 out of 180 countries on Transparency International's 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index.
       See Africa Portal, 2021. 'A Never Ending Problem: Ugandans Say Corruption Level has Increased, Rate Government Fight Against Corruption Poorly'. https://www.africaportal.org/publications/never-ending-problem-ugandans-say-corruption-level-has-increased-rate-government-fight-against-corruption-poorly/.

49   P. Atuhaire. 2021. 'Uganda's Yoweri Museveni: How an Ex-Rebel has Stayed in Power for 35 Years'. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55550932. A local government councillor stated that "much of the information we share with communities [related to P/CVE] is taken to be politic[al]. They do not trust us and can disfavour us during elections. In the end, you need to pay people to believe and agree with you." Interview with a female leader, 26 July 2022.

50   Ministry of Internal Affairs – Non-Governments Organizations Bureau (2018). SITUATIONAL REPORT ON THE NGO SECTOR IN UGANDA. 13 June 2018. Serena Hotel, Kigo. Kampala.

51   NGO Forum. https://ngoforum.or.ug/.

52   Africa Portal. 2020. 'The Question of Marginalisation and Vulnerability to Violent Extremism in Uganda'.
       https://www.africaportal.org/publications/question-marginalisation-and-vulnerability-violent-extremism-uganda/

53   US Department of State. 2021. 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda.
       https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/uganda/.

54   F.S. Namasinga. 2022. 'Anti-Terrorism Regulation and the Media in Uganda'. Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Oslo Metropolitan University. https://verfassungsblog.de/os4-uganda/.

55   Ibid.

56   J. Banfield and J. Naujoks. 2009. Enabling Peace Economies Through Early Recovery – Perspectives from Uganda.
       International Alert. https://www.international-alert.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Economy-Econ-Dimensions-Peacebuilding-Uganda-EN-2009.pdf.

57   During interviews, a respondent from the IRCU told us that "during times of political turmoil, as was the case in the previous election, we were the only ones who managed to convene political dialogues and debates, bring different voices to talk about the country and we also have the P/CVE mandate". Interview with a religious leader, 24 July 2022.

58   Interview with a member of the NTC, 27 July 2022.

59   The Independent. 2021. 'UPDF to beef up security for Albertine Oil and Gas'. 4 October.
       https://www.independent.co.ug/updf-to-beef-up-security-for-albertine-oil-and-gas/.

60   A local government leader stated, "We just see various CSOs and they help to support communities to sensitise and some access services, but the problem is they are not coordinated to pull their resources together to make a bigger impact in one area." Interview with a local government leader, 23 July 2022.

61   During interviews, a respondent told us, "We are always on the lookout for calls and apply for funding support, [but] donors are also very selective, and we struggle to meet their criteria. Sometimes we qualify but most often we do not." Another respondent mentioned that "the fact that the national strategy was not implemented, where we expected the government to allocate funds to implement it, we can only depend on donor funds. There are no other ways to raise these funds locally."

62   I. van Zyl and M. Mahdi. 2019. Preventing Violent Extremism in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Institute for Security Studies. East Africa Report 26. https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/preventing-violent-extremism-in-east-africa-lessons-from-kenya-somalia-tanzania-and-uganda.

63   During interviews, a local council leader remarked that "these are new problems in our society and no one should tell you that they are good at it. Local leaders know more about politics than preventing the problems it brings. We all need help." Interview with a local government leader, 23 July 2022.

64   UNODC. 2021. 'UNODC in Uganda consults with Civil Society Organizations working on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) and Prison Reform'. https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/unodc-in-uganda-consults-with-civil-society-organizations-working-on-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-pcve-and-prison-reform.html.

65   S. Zeiger and C. Mattei. 2018. National Capacity-Building Workshop on Preventing Violent Extremism through Education in Uganda: Workshop Report 23-25 Jan 2018. Hedayah, Unesco International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa. https://www.cvereferenceguide.org/en/resource/national-capacity-building-workshop-preventing-violent-extremism-through-education-uganda

66   B. Walsh. 2020. 'Revisiting Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa: Museveni's Uganda and Regional Security in East Africa', African Security, 13(4): 300-324.

67   European Commission and RUSI-Europe. 2022. 'Preventing and Countering VE Training in Uganda' Sheraton Hotel. Kampala, Uganda.15-16 June.

68   A. Glazzard and M. Jones. 2021. 'Improving the Evaluation of Interventions to Counter and Prevent Terrorism and Violent Extremism'. https://kbb9z40cmb2apwafcho9v3j-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/think-piece-me-final.pdf.

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